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The Elastics of Snap Removal:  
An Empirical Case Study of Textualism 
 
Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel & David McClure*© 
 
Abstract 
 
This article reports the findings of an empirical study of textualism as applied by 
federal judges interpreting the statute that permits removal of diversity cases from 
state to federal court. The “snap removal” provision in the statute is particularly 
interesting because its application forces judges into one of two interpretive 
camps—which are fairly extreme versions of textualism and purposivism, 
respectively. We studied characteristics of cases and judges to find predictors of 
textualist outcomes. In this article we offer a narrative discussion of key variables 
and we detail the results of our logistic regression analysis. The most salient 
predictive variable was the party of the president who appointed the judge. 
Female judges and young judges were also more likely to reach textualist 
outcomes. Cases involving torts were substantially more likely to be removed even 
though the statute raises a pure legal question upon which the subject matter of 
the case should have no bearing. Our most surprising finding was the impact of a 
judges’ undergraduate and legal education: the eliteness of the educational 
institution was positively correlated with removal for judges appointed by 
Republicans, but negatively correlated for judges appointed by Democrats. This 
disordinal interaction was especially striking since there was no party effect 
among judges who attended non-elite institutions. In addition to the 
aforementioned variables which were significant, several variables that were not 
predictive are also discussed; these include race, seniority, state court 
experience, and the prospect of multi-district case consolidations.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Scholars and judges are growing weary of the debate between textualism and purposivism.1 
Numerous studies have disputed the narrative that judges belong exclusively to one tribe or the 
other.2 And when reporting the results of their recent survey of appellate judges, Professor Abbe 
Gluck and Judge Richard Posner observed that their subjects assiduously avoided referring to 
themselves as either textualists or purposivists.3 There may be an emerging consensus that most 
judges fulfill their judicial role pragmatically, drawing sensibly from legislative history and other 
indicia of intent—with some judges invoking interpretive tools more frequently and liberally 
than others.4 Indeed, the bench, bar, and academy all have suggested that pragmatism, 
																																								 																				
1 Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1300-01 (2018) (referring to the debate as “boring”). 
2 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275 (2020); Michael C. Mikulic, The 
Emergence of Contextually Constrained Purposivism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 128 (2016); Richard M. Re, The 
New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407, 417 (2015). 
3 Gluck & Posner, supra, 131 HARV. L. REV. at 1302-03 (“None of the 42 judges [in their survey] … was willing to 
associate himself or herself” with textualism or purposivism without qualification.). 
4 See Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1057 (1998) 
(“In a significant sense, we are all textualists now.”); Glen Staszewski, Introduction to Symposium on Administrative 
Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (observing that symposium articles “suggest that ‘we are all 
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contextualism, soft brands of intentionalism, and other hybrids have replaced the extreme 
interpretive methodologies of textualism and purposivism 5 
 
But some of that literature does more than merely eulogize what they label a false dichotomy. 
It suggests that “statutory interpretation doctrine [i]s a way to express results in opinions, rather 
than as a tool that actually decides cases.”6 The real question, then, is what makes judges reach 
the outcome-decision that, in turn, leads them to use the tools of textualism and/or purposivism 
to justify that decision.7 We pick up the baton and answer that question. We examined hundreds 
of published and unpublished opinions authored by federal judges about the availability of so-
called “snap removal.” We personally hand-coded dozens of characteristics about each of the 
cases and the judges who decided them, and then incorporated certain variables into a logit 
model that predicts case outcomes no matter the court’s justification.8 
 
The empirical analysis is not our only contribution. Our study also offers a counterexample 
to those who find the textualism/purposivism debate passé. This section of the removal statute 
does not lend itself to the hybrid interpretive methodologies that allow a judge to be (or to 
purport to be) in some middle ground between the extremes of textualism and purposivism. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
purposivists again’”); James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation in the Courts of 
Appeals, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81, 722 (2017) (measuring liberal invocation of legislative history by textualists). 
This phenomenon is not new: 
“Do not expect anybody’s theory of statutory interpretation, whether it is your own or somebody 
else’s, to be an accurate statement of what courts actually do with statutes. The hard truth of the 
matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied 
theory of statutory interpretation. 
HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (Eskridge & Frickey eds., Found Press 1994) (1958). 
5 See Gluck & Posner, supra, 131 HARV. L. REV. at 1302-03; Brudney & Baum, supra, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 
751-52 (describing the interpretive approach of most appellate judges as “versatile,” “functional,” “practical,” 
“eclectic,” and “protean”); Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by 
the , 122 YALE L.J. 70, 90 (2012) (“Today, we are all textualists and we are all purposivists.”); Jonathan T. Molot, 
The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (“Textualism has outlived its utility as an 
intellectual movement… Textualists have been so successful discrediting strong purposivism, and distinguishing 
their new brand of ‘modern textualism’ from the older, more extreme ‘plain meaning’ school, that they no longer 
can identify, let alone conquer, any remaining territory between textualism’s adherents and nonadherents.”); Henry 
Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 733 (2010) (“Textualists have made an 
important contribution by forcing statutory interpreters to take the enacted text seriously; but they have persuaded 
few, if any, trained in the old school that, as the directive force of the statutory text attenuates, one can dispense with 
a comprehensive consideration of legislative purpose in determining statutory meaning.”). 
6 Gluck & Posner, supra, 131 HARV. L. REV. at 1314; see also id. at 1330, 1333; Michael Abramowicz & Emerson 
H. Tiller, Citation to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of 
Judicial Decision Making, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 423 (2009); Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The 
Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 21 (2003); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the 
Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 251 (1992). 
7	In this article we take a wide arc around the fine distinctions between and among textualism, originalism, original 
intent, plain meaning, original meaning, and the like; by “textualism” we simply mean the various schools of 
interpretation that emphasize text over purpose. Likewise, when referring to purposivism we mean any and all of the 
various schools of interpretation that invoke extrinsic interpretive aids in the prioritization of legislative purpose 
over legislative text when the two arguably conflict. 
8 A logistic regression model differs from the more-familiar linear regression model in that the outcome variable 
(here: removal) in logistic regression is binary or dichotomous. This difference is reflected both in the form of the 
model and its assumptions. With these adjustments, the same general principles apply.	
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Rather, application of the snap removal statute necessarily requires a strong commitment to one 
of those extremes.9 Accordingly, our study provides something of a census for the status of each 
of those methodologies in the courts—even if only for this narrow legal issue. 
 
A very short primer on removal, diversity jurisdiction, and the forum defendant rule will 
suffice for an understanding of snap removal. Fights about snap removal are about whether 
certain cases will proceed in state court or in federal court. The distinction matters because, inter 
alia, win rates can vary;10  in the modern era, defendants—especially corporate defendants—tend 
to prefer federal court.11 Defendants in civil matters involving state law claims may remove 
cases from state to federal court when there is complete diversity between the parties.12 Federal 
diversity jurisdiction is premised on the notion that state courts may be biased (or perceived as 
biased) against out-of-state parties.13 That premise, in turn, cues an exception to the right of 
																																								 																				
9 As with any legal issue, there are nuances in even the most seemingly clear dichotomy.  As noted above, the 
interpretative debate between permitting snap removal and rejecting it divides neatly into textualist and purposivist 
camps.  But in a prior article, we criticized the practice of snap removal not only because we reject textual literalism 
(arguably hyper-literalism in this context) and support purposivism as an interpretative tool, but also because various 
historical, structural, practical, and functional factors auger against snap removal, including the asymmetry of 
allowing an entity that is not subject to the control of the court (i.e., the unserved defendant) to utilize federal 
judicial power to divest the plaintiff of a chosen state court, which also has implications for federalism.  See Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, Thomas O. Main & David McClure, Snap Removal: Cause; Cacophony; and Cure, __ BAYLOR L. REV.  
__ (2020) (forthcoming). 
One might in fact describe opposition to snap removal as based on a functionalist jurisprudence (rather than a 
purely purposive approach) that rejects formalism and textualism.  See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, ERIK S. KNUTSEN & 
PETER N. SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 104 (5th ed. 2020)(distinguishing legal formalism and legal 
functionalism)   
For purposes of this empirical examination of judicial traits and decision making, snap removal nonetheless 
presents a stark illustration of the choice between embracing a literal reading of clear text and consideration of non-
textual indicia of meaning, which is commonly described as a purposive approach even though it might better be 
deemed a functional or instrumental approach. 
10 See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About The 
Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 (1998) (noting overall plaintiff 
win rate of 58 percent for cases initially filed in federal court compared to win rate of 37 percent for removed cases); 
Marc Galanter, Planet of the Aps: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1389-1391 
(2006) (summarizing studies). 
11 Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, The Curious Incident of the Falling Win Rate: Individual vs. System-
Level Justification and the Rule of Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1371 (2019); Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent 
Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1017-18, 1023 & 1027-28 (2016); Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic 
and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigations in the 
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1322 (2005). See also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., 
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION (2000); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY 
(1992); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 
(1988). 
12 Complete diversity exists when the states of citizenship of all plaintiffs do not overlap with any of the states of 
citizenship of all defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (providing original jurisdiction over actions between “citizens of 
different States.” See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 267 (1806) (requiring complete diversity). 
13 See The Federalist No. 80, at 537-38 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961) (articulating the bias 
rationale); Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 61, 87 (1809) (observing national courts as forum to 
address “possible fears and apprehensions”). See generally Graham C. Lilly, Making Sense of Nonsense: Reforming 
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 181, 190 (1998); Scott Dodson, Beyond Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 69 
DUKE L.J. 267 (2019) (reviewing traditional basis and collecting sources); John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity 
Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. LEGIS. 403 (1979) (recognizing bias as a danger). The empirics and the wisdom of the 
underlying premise have long been questioned. See, e.g., Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 
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removal: preventing removal of a diversity case by a citizen of the forum state;14 after all, a local 
defendant needs no escape from their home court. 
 
This exception—often called the forum defendant rule—has been a part of the jurisdictional 
schema of removal since the federal courts were established.15 The statute has been amended on 
several occasions and currently provides that a case “may not be removed if any of the parties in 
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is 
brought.”16  The italicized language was added in 1948. Although there is no legislative history 
directly on point, the obvious purpose of the “joined and served” language was to prevent 
gamesmanship by plaintiffs. Such gamesmanship was made possible by the Supreme Court’s 
Pullman Co. v. Jenkins decision in 1939.17 The reasoning in that decision created the opportunity 
for plaintiffs to exploit (a blander version of) the forum defendant rule by naming but not serving 
a forum defendant. The 1948 amendment thus added language to prevent plaintiffs from 
nominally joining a forum defendant (as a sham) and then never serving them, thereby thwarting 
removal by the out-of-state defendant even though the plaintiff was never seriously pursuing the 
forum defendant.18 
 
Ironically, paradoxically even, the forum defendant rule now facilitates gamesmanship by 
defendants. Because of the quoted, italicized language added by the 1948 amendment, forum 
defendants claim that the forum defendant rule does not apply, provided defendants file their 
notice of removal prior to service; after all, the forum defendant rule is an exception to the right 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
HARV. L. REV. 483, 493-95 (1928) (interrogating the existence of bias); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 142-43 (1985) (disputing the prevalence of bias); PURCELL, supra, at 181 (suggesting 
that, instead, maintaining “federal jurisdiction over issues and interests … [of] national importance” has been the 
Court’s touchstone). 
14 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 
15 For a meticulous account of the history, see Hawkins v. Cottrell, Inc., 785 F.Supp.2d 1361, 1373-78 (N.D. Ga. 
2011); Bowman v. PHH Mtg. Corp., 423 F.Supp.3d 1286, 1291 & n.5 (N.D. Ala. 2019). 
16 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (italics added). 
17 305 U.S. 534, 59 S. Ct. 347 (1939). 
18 The basic purpose of the language is agreed upon by commentators, although they may differ in their views of the 
propriety of snap removal. See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Pre-Service Removal in the Federal Defendant’s 
Arsenal, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 147 (2011-2012) (finding snap removal appropriate notwithstanding the purpose of the 
language); Matthew Curry, Note, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Denied: Arguing for Pre-Service Removal Under the 
Plain Language of the Forum-Defendant Rule, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 907 (2010) (same); Jordan Bailey, Comment, 
Giving State Courts the Ol’ Slip: Should a Defendant be Allowed to Remove an Otherwise irremovable Case to 
Federal Court Solely Because Removal was Made Before Any Defendant is Served?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 181 
(2009) (criticizing snap removal as inconsistent with overall structure of removal and diversity jurisdiction). 
Judges likewise acknowledge the obvious purpose of the language. 
Despite the lack of [legislative history], the purpose of the ‘properly joined and served requirement of section 
14419b) is abundantly clear in light of the historical development of the policy of the remand provisions, the 
practical application of the ‘joined and served’ provision by district courts in recent decades, and common sense.” 
Sullivan v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F.Supp.2d 640, 644 (D.N.J. 2008). See also Brown v. Organon Intern. Inc., 
2008 WL 2833294, at *5  (D.N.J. July 21, 2008) (remanding rather than “violate the clear purpose of the legislative 
provision”); Marsh v. Monster Bev. Corp., 2016 WL 11508266, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2016) (“District courts 
across the country have concluded that the rule serves to ‘prevent plaintiffs from improperly joining forum 
defendants that they do not actually intend to pursue in order to prevent removal from state court,’ which was a 
‘pervasive problem’ at the time the ‘properly joined and served’ language was adopted by Congress in 1948.”) 
(citing Standing v. Watson Pharma., Inc., 2009 WL 842211, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2009) (collecting cases)); 
Saratoga Advantage Trust Tech. & Comms. Portfolio v. Marvell Technology Group, 2015 WL 9269166, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015) (allowing snap removal and denying motion to remand, “[n]otwithstanding the rule’s purpose”). 
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of removal, and that exception applies only to forum defendants who have been “properly … 
served.”19 Because this tactic works only if the notice of removal is filed in the brief time period 
between filing and service, it is often referred to as “snap removal.”20 And, as we document 
below, more than half of judges allow it. To be clear, with this tactic, forum defendants are 
removing diversity cases to federal court for the first time since 1789. 
 
In this article, we are agnostic on questions about how the statute should be applied. We have 
argued elsewhere that allowing snap removal requires an excessively textualist reading of the 
statute that derogates the history, purpose, and logic of both diversity jurisdiction and removal.21 
We also proposed a fix—one that textualists who loathe snap removal might even welcome.22 
But our focus in this article is not how it should be applied or fixed, but rather how in fact it is 
applied. Simply stated, we interrogate the questions: what are the traits of a judge that allows 
snap removal under the current statute?  and what are the traits of a judge that rejects snap 
removal?  
 
Our questions lend insight into the evergreen debate of textualism versus purposivism, 
because this statute has an unusual quality that forces judges into one interpretive camp or the 
other. Indeed, applications of this statute require either a hyper-literal reading that flouts 
Congressional intent or a purposive reading that evades crystal-clear text; there is no middle 
ground. 
 
To reject snap removal requires an especially strong brand of purposivism because the text 
unambiguously limits the scope of the forum defendant rule to those who have been served. This 
is not a scrivener’s error. Nor is it patently absurd to allow forum defendants access to a federal 
court in diversity cases; forum plaintiffs, for example, have access to a federal court in diversity 
cases.23 The statutory schema refers broadly to “defendants” in other parts, but qualifies the 
scope of the forum defendant rule to defendants who have been served.24 The plain meaning of 
the statute suggests no need to consult legislative history. And worse, there is no legislative 
history to directly contradict the plain meaning. The historical context of the statute confirms a 
different purpose (to prevent gamesmanship by plaintiffs), but that purpose is irrelevant or at 
																																								 																				
19 By referring to the forum defendant rule as an “exception” we have accepted the characterization typically 
employed by defendants. Alternatively, the forum defendant rule is a limitation on the right to remove. 
20 While the term “snap removal” appears to have taken hold among many courts, practitioners, and academics, 
others have referred to the practice by different monikers, such as “pre-service removal,” Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 2019); “early removal,” Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F.Supp.2d 726, 733 (N.D. 
Ill. 2007); “jack rabbit removal,” Beavers v. Medtronic, Inc., 41 F.Supp.3d 633, 639 (W.D. Ky. 2014); “race to 
remove,” Ayala-Castro v. GlaxoSmithKline (In re Avandia Mktg.), 624 F.Supp.2d 396, 409-410 (E.D. Pa. 2009);; 
“preemptive removal,” Bailey, supra, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. at 182; “snatch and remove,” Paul D. Rheingold, 
Removal, Remand, and Transfer, in LITIGATING MASS TORT CASES § 5.24 (May 2020 update); and “wrinkle 
removal” (because the practice “capitalize[s] on a ‘wrinkle’ in the language of 28 U.S.C § 1441(b)(2)”), Rachel B. 
Weil, Remand Denied in Two Shingles Vaccine Cases out of the District of New Jersey, DRUG & DEVICE LAW BLOG 
(Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2019/02/nd-denied-in-two-shingles-vaccine-cases-out-of-
the-district-of-new-jersey.html. 
21 Stempel et al., supra, __ BAYLOR L. REV. at __ (forthcoming). 
22	Id.	
23 There is no forum plaintiff rule that prevents in-state plaintiffs from filing a diversity action in a federal district 
court in their home state.  
24 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
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most orthogonal to the plain meaning of the text; it is not directly contradictory.25 All this is to 
say that there is not even a strained reading of the text for the purposivist to use as a fig leaf to 
hide behind.26 
 
Yet to allow snap removal requires an especially strong brand of textualism because the text 
is inconsistent with tradition, principle, and common sense. Congress did not intend the 
availability of a federal forum to turn on the timing of service. Congress did not intend to elevate 
the idiosyncrasies of state service practice and procedure into something that is outcome-
determinative. Congress could not have foreseen that advances in technology would allow 
defendants to know that they had sued before they had been served. And worse, snap removal 
gives comparatively wealthy defendants another procedural weapon to disarm comparatively 
impoverished plaintiffs; even someone who is not bothered by favoring this lot could be troubled 
by the optics. All this is to say that there is not a shred of Congressional intent for the textualist 
to use as a fig leaf to hide behind.27 
 
We emphasize this binary choice because its starkness served to clarify the data that we 
classified and analyzed. We could safely assume that: (1) Judges who allowed snap removal are 
textualists (at least for this particular issue); and (2) judges who disallowed snap removal are 
purposivists (at least for this particular issue). We had to apply the labels because, as Gluck and 
																																								 																				
25 See, e.g., Gibbons, supra, 919 F.3d at 699. 
26 Searches for the middle ground may be noble and well-intentioned, but are unavailing. In an effort to bolster our 
purposivist understanding of the forum defendant rule with text, we have suggested that a named-but-unserved party 
may not be a “defendant”. Because only defendants can remove, this reading would prevent some of the most 
egregious instances of snap removal. We also observe that this analysis is problematic in that it “runs counter to a 
significant body of case law and commentary.” Stempel et al., supra, __ BAYLOR L. REV. at __ (forthcoming). 
Another “formalist” objection to snap removal can be raised in certain unique circumstances. For example, 
when a forum defendant is the only defendant, snap removal could be denied on the basis that the absence of any 
joinder of parties means that the “joined and served” language of § 1441(b) cannot be satisfied. But without 
resorting to the purpose of the forum defendant rule, failure to trigger the “joined and served” criterion would seem 
to authorize removal (because the limitation upon or exception to removal would not apply). 
Another “formalist” objection to snap removal could leverage the federalism canon. See generally Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991). Pursuant to this canon, the snap removal statute should be interpreted to 
avoid interfering with state court jurisdiction over matters involving forum defendants. Many opinions in our dataset 
referenced the notion that removal statutes should be construed narrowly—“in order to promote the goals of 
federalism, restrict federal court jurisdiction, and support the plaintiff’s right to choose the forum.” Torchlight Loan 
Servs., LLC v. Column Financial, Inc., 2013 WL 3863887 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2013). Our point here is that none of 
these opinions refers to this is as a “canon,” which is the currency of textualism. See generally William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW (2012)); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909 (2016). 
Another purportedly formalist-like objection to snap removals distinguishes snap-removals initiated by forum 
defendants from snap-removals initiated by out-of-state defendants. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Apotex Corp., 2008 WL 
11332029 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2008). But this is not a textual argument. Rather it draws on the purpose of removal, to-
wit: “to protect out-of-state defendants from possible prejudices in state court.” Id. at *2. 
27 Searches for the middle ground may be noble and well-intentioned, but are unavailing. In an effort to bolster its 
textualist result by genuflecting to a hypothetical purpose, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
suggested that “Congress may [have intended to] provide a bright-line rule keyed on service, which is more clearly 
more easily administered than a fact-specific inquiry into a plaintiff’s intent or opportunity to actually serve a home-
state defendant.” Gibbons, supra, 919 F.3d at 706 (citing no relevant authority); see also Texas Brine Co., LLC v. 
American Arb. Assoc., Inc., 955 F.3d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 2020) (same). That “a reasonable person could intend the 
results of [this] plain language,” Texas Brine, L.L.C., supra, 955 F.3d at 486, is surely more damning than 
persuasive. For the origins of this reasonable person standard, see SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 37. 
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Posner observed through their surveys, judges do not label themselves.28 Although these 
opinions exhibit much reverence for text, the word “textualist” appears in only one opinion in 
our dataset,29 and “textualism” not even once. “Purposivism” and “purposivist” do not appear at 
all; though, naturally, “purpose” is a popular referent. 
 
We coded the courts’ reasoning in every removal case.30 In cases allowing snap removal, 
judges invoked the refrains of textualism to justify their results even if not also naming the 
hymnal from which they were drawn. Typical examples from judicial opinions include the 
following: 
 
• “The plain meaning of Section 1441(b)(2) is clear and unambiguous.”31 
 
• “Read literally, the forum defendant rule only precludes removal when a forum defendant 
has been ‘properly joined and served.’”32 
 
• “[T]he language of the statute is plain, and, thus, adherence to the plain language is 
required.”33 
 
• “This court must apply the statute as it is written, and not as plaintiffs maintain it is 
intended.”34 
 
And in every case that rejected snap removal judges sampled the familiar rhymes of 
purposivism to justify their results even if not also crediting their source material. Typical 
examples from judicial opinions include the following: 
 
• “[Applying t]he plain meaning of the statute … would eviscerate the purpose of the forum 
defendant rule. The court may not adopt a plain language interpretation of a statutory 
provision that directly undercuts the clear purpose of the statute.”35 
 
• “[G]iving effect to the plain language of the forum defendant rule … would result in an 
outcome at odds with the intentions of its drafters…. [T]here [is] no evidence that Congress 
… intended to create an arbitrary means for a forum defendant to avoid the forum 
defendant rule simply by filing a notice of removal before the plaintiff is able to effect 
process.”36 
 
																																								 																				
28 Gluck & Posner, supra, 131 HARV. L. REV. at 1302-03. 
29 See Breitweiser v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 2015 WL 6322625, at 5 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (observing that “[e]ven 
the most ardent textualist” will consider legislative intent and history to avoid an absurd result). The word “text” 
appears in only 54 of the opinions; references to the language of the statute are much more popular. 
30 Such references refer included cases that were ultimately remanded after snap removal. To be clear, removal 
occurs upon filing by the defendant; it is not a motion and it does not require permission of the court. The propriety 
of a removal is tested by the filing, by plaintiff, of a motion to remand. 
31 Dechow v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 358 F.Supp.3d 1051, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2019). 
32 Selective Ins. Co. of South Carolina v. Target Corp., 2013 WL 12205696, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2013) (citing 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)). 
33 Poznanovich v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, 2011 WL 6180026, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2011). 
34 Johnson v. Precision Airmotive, LLC, 2007 WL 4289656, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 4 2007). 
35 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mozilo, 2012 WL 11047336, at*2 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2012). 
36 Williams v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., 13 F.Supp.3d 426, 431 (D.N.J. 2014). 
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• “A literal reading of Section 1441(b)(2) is clearly at odds with Congress’s intent to 
eliminate gamesmanship [by plaintiffs].”37 
 
• “The courts must look beyond the plain meaning of the statutory language…. Congress 
could not have intended the result sought by defendant.”38 
 
Our aim with these quotes is merely to convey that removing and remanding judges 
make the noises of textualism and purposivism, respectively. There is no opinion in our 
dataset where the judge relies principally on the statutory text to remand or on the 
statute’s purpose to remove.39  
 
The statute is also somewhat unique in that its applications are almost unreviewable as a 
matter of appellate practice and procedure.40 Accordingly, more than 95% of the opinions in our 
dataset were authored by district court judges. This has numerous benefits. First, it helps answer 
the call of those who have hailed the “merits of turning more scholarly attention away from the 
Supreme Court and instead to the everyday decisionmakers in the system.”41  
 
More substantively, district court opinions do not have the obfuscations that plague studies of 
appellate opinions. For example, we can avoid the uncertainty regarding whether the content of 
an opinion is the true expression of the judge or is instead the product of a compromise to obtain the 
support of judicial colleagues.42 Further, the (published and unpublished) opinions of district court 
judges are usually written with a degree of candor and directness because they are not written for 
an extrajudicial audience.43  
																																								 																				
37 Penn v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2017 WL 8229625, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2017). 
38 Prather v. Kindred Hosp., 2014 WL 7238089 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 17, 2014). 
39 See text and accompanying notes (“TAN”)  ____, supra [the two footnotes referring to searches for middle 
ground].	
40 An order of remand is unreviewable. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (prohibiting review of a district court’s order remanding 
a case to state court subject to exceptions not relevant here); Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansorfer, 423 U.S. 336 
(1976) (limiting prohibition of appellate review to grounds specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), namely (i) lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, and (ii) any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Lively v. Wild Oats 
Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases); Holmstrom v. Peterson, 492 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(same). 
The denial of a motion to remand is reviewable, but must await a final judgment. So the issue seldom reaches 
the Courts of Appeals. But see Texas Brine, L.L.C., supra, 955 F.3d at 482 (plaintiff appealed after district court 
granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings); Gibbons, supra, 919 F.3d at 699 (plaintiff appealed after 
district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone 
Mansion Rest. Inc., 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018) (plaintiff appealed after district court granted defendant’s motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim). 
See Adam Sopko, Swift Removal,  manuscript on file with authors, *16 n.105 (publication forthcoming) (citing 
Curry, supra,  58 Clev. St. L. Rev. at 931-32; Arthur Hellman et al., Neutralizing the Strategem of “Snap Removal”: 
A Proposed Amendment to the Judicial Code, 9 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 103, 106-07 (2016); Valerie M. Nannery, Closing 
the Snap Removal Loophole, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 541, 557-58 (2018); Tempe D. Smith, Snap Removal: What Is It 
and What Do You Do If It Happens to You, 39 ALA. ASS’N JUST. J. 55, 57 (2019)). 
41 Gluck & Posner, supra, 131 HARV. L. REV. at 1306 (referring to Appeals Court judges as everyday 
decisionmakers) (citing RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)). 
42 See, e.g., Abramowicz & Tiller, supra, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. at 420 (explaining how the choice of what to put in an 
opinion “may be driven more by collegiality or strategic calculation in an effort to persuade or assuage the other 
judges and courts than by an authoring judge’s own preferences”); Brudney & Baum, supra, 58 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. at 744 (explaining possible influence of collegiality and strategy in judicial behavior). 
43 See generally Brudney & Baum, supra, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 759. 
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To be sure, district court opinions are frequently short—and also lean in their justification 
and reasoning. But that shortcoming is no handicap in a study that is focused principally on 
matters that are upstream from the decision, such as the demographics of the judge, rather than 
downstream, such as the justification for that decision. 
 
The availability of snap removal also presents a pure question of law that simplified coding 
and analysis. Further, this is not the sort of legal question that judges might strategically recast as 
a fact question or a mixed law-and-fact question in order to shield a judge’s policy preferences 
from appellate review.44 The legal question requires no fact finding and is, thus, usefully naked. 
Shielding the decision from appellate review is also not a concern when appellate review is 
unlikely in any event.  
 
We anticipated that our study’s focus primarily on district court opinions would present its 
own challenges. For example, compared with their appellate counterparts, district judges have a 
more demanding caseload, less law clerk and library support, burdensome efficiency mandates, 
and inferior briefs from parties. One might predict that this would bias a district judge toward 
textualism since text requires comparatively less of an investment than what is required to 
unearth legislative history. But with regard to snap removal there is no buried treasure; there was 
little to learn from an interpretive standpoint, and the legislative context has long been clear, 
widely available, and persuasive to the persuadable.45 
 
Another challenge when studying district court opinions is the hierarchy (or principal-agent) 
effect. A trial judge’s decision (and/or the justification of that decision) may be a prediction of 
the appellate court’s preference, rather than a sincere expression of the trial judge’s own.46 But 
yet again, a judge’s decision on a motion to remand is practically unreviewable. 
 
The near-unreviewability of applications of this statute also means that we have three 
decades of essentially unchecked variation among district courts. There was no binding 
precedent on snap removal anywhere prior to the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit in the fall of 2018.47 In the state court where that suit began, the Pennsylvania 
																																								 																				
44 Cf. Abramowicz & Tiller, supra, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. at 423-24 (citing Emerson H. Tiller and Pablo T. Spiller, 
Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 349 
(1999); Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 61 (2002); Max Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 24 (2007)). 
45	See, e.g., Hawkins v. Cottrell, Inc., 785 F.Supp.2d 1361, 1373-1378 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Sullivan v. Novartis 
Pharms. Corp., 575 F.Supp.2d 640, 644 (D.N.J. 2008).	
46 See generally Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System: A Principal-Agent Perspective, 47 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 819, 822 (2003); Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 2017, 2071 (2016); Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 535, 538 (2011); Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 403-404 (2007). 
47 Encompass Ins. Co., supra, 902 F.3d at 147. 
There are earlier Appeals Court decisions that discuss snap removal more or less directly, but none is resolved 
exclusively on the snap removal issue, and none is treated as binding on the issue by lower courts in those circuits. 
See McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001); Clarence E. Morris, Inc. v. Vitek, 412 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1969); 
Goodwin v. Reynolds, 757 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2014). See also Little v. Wyndham Worldwide Ops., Inc., 251 
F.Supp.3d 1215, 1219 (M.D. Tenn. 2017) (“McCall is not controlling….”); Loewen v. McDonnell, 2019 WL 
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defendant’s lawyer had agreed orally to accept service on his client’s behalf, but then removed to 
federal court rather than return the form that would have constituted service. The dubious nature 
of these circumstances deterred neither the federal district court nor the appeals court from 
endorsing snap removal.48 Since the Third Circuit’s decision in Encompass Ins. Co., two more 
circuit courts have likewise endorsed snap removal: in early 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit decided Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company,49 and on April 7, 2020, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Texas Brine Co., LLC v. American Arb. 
Assoc., Inc..50 Textualism is winning. 
 
Turning then to our key findings which we summarize here. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the best 
single predictor of case outcomes was the party of the president who appointed the judge. 
Following the familiar stereotype, judges appointed by Republicans were significantly more 
likely (than their colleagues appointed by Democrats) to reach a textualist outcome.  
 
Other significant variables included the subject-matter of the action: torts cases were more 
likely to be snap-removed than contract cases. Because the statute itself is context-independent, 
the courts’ appetite for tort cases hinted at some ideological effect. We found more evidence of 
such effects in the rates at which judges published their opinions. 
 
Women allowed snap removal at higher rates than men. Younger judges, too, were 
substantially more likely than their senior colleagues to reach textualist outcomes.  
 
We found that the eliteness of the institution where a judge received his or her undergraduate 
and legal education was not only a strong predictor of case outcomes, but this eliteness variable 
had disordinal effects on Republican and Democratic appointees. Moreover, we observed that 
Democratic appointees who attended non-elite institutions had the same removal rate as 
Republican appointees who attended non-elite institutions. All party effects, then, were manifest 
among those Democratic and Republican judges who attended elite institutions. This was a 
striking finding about party polarization within the judiciary. 
 
The data also rejected several theories that we tested: the prospect for multi district litigation 
in complex cases, for example, had no observable effect on snap removal rates. Similarly, the 
race or ethnicity of the judge was not predictive. Nor was the amount of prior judicial 
experience, including whether the judge previously served as a state court judge.  
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
2364413 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2019) (distinguishing Vitek as addressing the question whether the citizenship of 
unserved defendants should be considered in evaluating whether diversity jurisdiction exists); Timbercreek Asset 
Mgmt., Inc. V. De Guardiola, 2019 WL 947279 , at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2019) (referring to the Goodwin court’s 
discussion of snap removal as “dicta”). 
48 Encompass Ins. Co., supra, 902 F.3d at 153-154 (“[W]e conclude that the language of the forum defendant rule in 
section 1441(b)(2) is unambiguous… Permitting removal on the facts of this case does not contravene the apparent 
purpose [of the statute, to-wit:] fraudulent joinder by a plaintiff…. [T]his result may be peculiar in that it allows 
Stone Mansion to use pre-service machinations to remove a case that it otherwise could not…., [but t]here are 
simply no grounds upon which we would substitute Encompass’ interpretation for the literal interpretation. 
Reasonable minds might conclude that the procedural result demonstrates a need for a change in the law; however, if 
such change is required, it is Congress—not the Judiciary—that must act.”). 
49 919 F.3d 699 (2d Cir. 2019). 
50 955 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2020). 
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II. Methodology 
 
Our data derive from repeated and redundant searches of Lexis and Westlaw databases of 
published and unpublished federal court opinions at the district and circuit court levels. We 
identified cases from 1960 through 2019, utilizing targeted keyword searches with Boolean 
connectors, key number and headnote searches, and case citators.51 Although this approach may 
admit occasional errors, we have no reason to believe that those errors would have any bias. One 
or more of the named authors then read each case in this pool of 337 opinions. Because our 
search terms erred on the side of being overly inclusive, nearly many of the cases in that pool 
were principally about fraudulent joinder or lack of diversity jurisdiction, and did not allow or 
require the judge to rule specifically on the issue of snap removal. 
 
Nearly 300 cases involving snap removal were entered (by hand, by the authors) into a 
database. The data set included, for each opinion, data identifying the case name, citation, 
whether the opinion was published or unpublished, year, the state where the court was located, 
type(s) of plaintiff(s), type(s) of defendant(s), which defendant filed the notice of removal, 
subject matter of the case, disposition, stated rationale, length of discussion, key authorities 
relied upon, the identity of the judge, and miscellaneous notes. We then supplemented the dataset 
with additional research in order to code whether the action was a prospect for consolidation.52  
 
We also researched and coded demographic characteristics about each judge: date of judicial 
appointment, appointing president, gender, race, year of birth, prior judicial experience, other 
work experience, and details of their undergraduate and legal education. This data about the 
judges was drawn from the Federal Judges Biographical Database, Wikipedia, and various 
websites including those maintained by district and circuit courts.53 
 
We excluded cases that were decided by magistrate judges. This decision was informed by 
the lack of reliable demographic information about all magistrate judges; we did not want to 
include some of their opinions and not all. The authority of magistrate judges also varies 
																																								 																				
51 One of our first steps was to run keyword searches in the Lexis and Westlaw case databases for “snap removal” 
and its various nicknames.  See TAN __, supra [referring to nicknames like “wrinkle removal”].  However, not all 
snap removal cases (particularly older ones) use a consistent term or phrase to describe the practice, so we utilized 
other methods to find true snap removal cases.  Among the techniques we used was reviewing case citator reports 
from Shepard’s and KeyCite for numerous opinions, particularly the published circuit court decisions available at 
the time (Stone Mansion and Gibbons) and those that were frequently cited in other cases and in the secondary 
literature.  We also ran keywords searches and generated case citator reports of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) limited by 
Boolean searches of frequently appearing terms, such as “PLAIN /S MEANING” OR ABSURD OR 
GAMESMANSHIP.  We reviewed cases listed in the citator reports, identified cases cited in those cases, and 
continued repeating variations of the process until we consistently ran across citations to the same published and 
unpublished opinions. 
52 In some instances consolidation was apparent from the opinion in our dataset. See, e.g., In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin 
Calcium) Mktg, Sales Practices and Prods. Lia. Litig., 2016 WL 7338594 (D.S.C. Nov. 21, 2016); Valido-Shade v. 
Wyeth, LLC, 875 F.Supp.2d 474 (E.D. Pa. 2012). In other instances, we consulted the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation to determine whether the action was a candidate for consolidation. See https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/.  
53 See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-Present, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges; 
en.wikipedia.org (last visited June 1, 2020). See, e.g., United States District Court, Boston Judge Information, 
www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/boston-judgeinfo.htm (last visited June 1, 2020). 
13	
	
considerably by district,54 and it was often unclear whether the available opinion was only a 
report and recommendation or was, instead, a matter being resolved by a magistrate judge upon 
consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636. Note, however, that several opinions included in 
our dataset were decisions by a district judge adopting the report and recommendation of a 
magistrate judge.55 
 
We also excluded cases decided by district judges after the issuance of binding precedent by 
a circuit court. Our empirical study assumed that judges had some freedom to choose between 
the textualist and purposivist approaches to the forum defendant rule. Once the Third Circuit 
issued its opinion in Encompass Ins. Co.,56 district court judges in Delaware, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania lacked that freedom. And of course the same logic applies for federal district court 
judges in those states encompassing the Second and Fifth Circuits, after those circuit courts 
issued binding precedent in Gibbons and Texas Brine, respectively.57 We included the decisions 
of the nine circuit judges who formed the panels on those appellate cases. 
 
Our dataset thus differs in scope from other scholars who have examined snap removal from 
different perspectives and with different objectives. Readers who are especially interested in 
matters regarding the frequency of snap removals and the identity of the snap removers are 
strongly encouraged to read our colleagues’ work.58  
 
We uploaded our dataset into Stata, a command-driven software package for statistical 
analysis. Because the principal focus of our study was judicial decisions, we clustered the 
standard errors for judges who wrote more than one opinion in our dataset.59 We did not want to 
misrepresent the magnitude of our dataset, and we did not want to distort any of our findings by 
counting echoes as distinct voices.  
 
One important exception to this protocol involved judges who issued more than one decision 
when those decisions were not consistently for or against snap removal. Five judges drifted from 
one side of the snap-removal divide to the other—all five from allowing snap removals to 
denying them. After considering various options, we decided to include these five judges in both 
of their respective iterations, treating their changed heart as a new person. This had the virtue of 
inclusion. Unfortunately it also sabotaged predictive models by putting the same five judges in 
both camps, ensuring five erroneous predictions no matter the model.  
 
																																								 																				
54 See generally Hon. Philip M. Pro, United States Magistrate Judges: Present But Unaccounted For, 16 NEV. L.J. 
783 (2016); Douglas A. Lee & Thomas E. Davis, “Nothing Less than Indispensable”: The Expansion of Magistrate 
Judge Authority and Utilization in the Past Quarter Century, 16 NEV. L.J. 845 (2016).  In addition, of course, 
Magistrate Judges are not selected by Republican or Democratic Presidents in the same sense as are Article III 
judges in that the Article I magistrate judges are as a practical matter selected by the Article III judges of the 
relevant district.	
55 See, e.g., Higgins v. City of Savannah, Ga., 2018 WL 2424138 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2018) (Smith, George R., M.J.), 
adopted by Higgins v. City of Savannah, Ga., 2018 WL 2418550 (S.D. Ga. May 29, 2018) (Moore, Wm. T, Jr., 
D.J.).  
56 Encompass Ins. Co., supra, 902 F.3d at 147. 
57 Gibbons, supra, 919 F.3d at 699; Texas Brine, supra, 955 F.3d 482. 
58 See Sopko, supra; Nannery, supra, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. at 541. 
59 See, e.g., Gentile v. Biogen Idec, Inc., 934 F.Supp.2d 313 (D. Mass. 2013) (Woodlock, J.); Howard v. Genentech, 
Inc., 2013 WL 680200 (D. Mass. 2013) (Woodlock, J.). 
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Net of these decisions, our core dataset included 193 unique cases of first impression. A 
dataset of 193 judges is a robust size for a study of federal judges. One useful reference point is 
that there are currently 677 authorized district court judgeships.60 But because our dataset spans 
three decades of caselaw, only 94 (or 49%) of the cases in our dataset were authored by judges 
who are currently active Article III judges. Another 69 (or 36%) of the cases in our dataset were 
authored by judges who are currently on the bench with senior status. 
 
Although we made efforts to ensure that our dataset was the entire population of the scope of 
cases that we have described, we acknowledge that out dataset was but a sample of a larger 
population that included cases beyond our reach.61 Accordingly, we were sensitive to concerns 
about the representativeness of our dataset. To that end, we observed that 46 cases (or 24%) were 
authored by female judges, and 44 (or 23%) were authored by judges who are persons of color. 
These numbers correlated fairly closely with the gender and racial diversity among current 
federal district court judges which is 33% and 28%, respectively.62 Our numbers were heavy 
with white and with male district judges, but diversity lags in federal courts and our study 
spanned a 30-year window of judicial decision-making. 
 
Of the cases in our dataset, 92 (or 48%) were authored by judges who were appointed by 
Democratic Presidents and 101 (or 52%) by judges who were appointed by Republican 
Presidents. These numbers correlate closely with the current federal district court bench which, 
according to one recent estimate, is divided 52%/48% with the slight majority being appointed 
by Democratic Presidents.63 
 
A separate issue of representativeness regards the potential for distortion because of selection 
bias that could attend the decision to publish an opinion in the official reporters or to make it 
available for the online databases to upload it.64 We were mindful of this risk, but our concerns 
faded with increased investigation. A judge’s decision on a motion to remand a snap-removed 
case is dispositive of an important question of law about the court’s subject matter jurisdiction; it 
is not a mine-run matter that merely requires another exercise of judicial discretion. It is also a 
threshold issue that is unlikely to get lost in the fog of litigation or rolled into some other issue.  
 
Nor is it the sort of motion that a judge would be looking to shield from disclosure because, 
say, its resolution is unusually political, embarrassing, or complicated. Judges had plenty of 
																																								 																				
60 See https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/districtauth.pdf (last visited May 12, 2020) (detailing 
Congressional authorization for 667 permanent and 10 temporary district court judgeships). 
61 Valerie Nannery reviewed snap removal cases over a three-year period from 2012 to 2014 compiling a data set of 
221 cases. She utilized Westlaw, Google Scholar, and electronic court records and administrative case documents of 
the federal district courts. See Nannery, supra, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. at 541. That study was recently updated by Adam 
Sopko. See Sopko, supra. Our study differs in that it utilizes Westlaw and Lexis to review unpublished and 
published opinions over a longer period of time. In order to achieve this broader perspective spanning several 
decades, an in-depth review of every federal docket to identify snap removal cases was not feasible. The opinions 
we have gathered constitute a robust and substantial data set, but we join Ms. Nannery in acknowledging many 
limiting factors that “make it next to impossible to identify every snap removed case in the federal district courts.” 
See Nannery, supra, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. at 561 n. 118.  
62 See https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/diversity-bench (last visited May 12, 2020); 
https://www.acslaw.org/judicial-nominations/diversity-of-the-federal-bench/ (last visited May 12, 2020). 
63 See https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_District_Court#cite_note-1 (last visited July 3, 2020).	
64 See TAN, ___ infra (six footnotes describing selection bias by judges and commercial legal publishers). 
15	
	
cover and company no matter their decision, because snap-removal decisions were about evenly 
divided between removals and remands (53% and 47%, respectively).  
 
Finally, the issue with representativeness is not that our dataset included every one of those 
orders, but rather that the opinions and the orders that were available and included were not 
systematically different than the opinions and the orders that were unavailable and not included. 
 
III. Findings 
 
We divide the discussion of our empirical findings into three parts. In Part A we discuss 
general findings about snap removal. These findings describe the phenomenon of snap removal 
generally, such as when and where it is happening, and what is published. In Part B we examine 
specific variables that correlate with snap removal—which is to explore the who and why. In 
Part C we describe a predictive model that integrates four key variables. 
 
A. General Discussion 
 
This Part is divided into three sections. In the first section we trace the recent history of snap-
removal rates. In the second section we map the geographic areas where the issue is arising and 
where snap removals are allowed. These areas are concentrated, and we offer various 
explanations for these patterns. In the third section we chart the rate at which opinions raising the 
snap removal issue are published in the official reporters (as opposed to unpublished but 
available in commercial databases); these numbers are lower than one might expect.  
 
1. Historical Rates of Removal 
 
Our dataset of 193 opinions includes published and publicly available unpublished opinions 
by judges who are offering their first impressions on snap removal. The cases are almost evenly 
divided with a total aggregate successful removal rate of 53% for the past 30 years. The annual 
rates have varied from 0% to 100% during these three decades, albeit with extremely small 
populations in some years.65 In figure 1 we clustered the removal rates to more elegantly convey 
the trend.  
																																								 																				
65 As recently as 2006, the removal rate was 100% (n=2); and as recently as 2003, the removal rate was 0% (n=1). 
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Figure	1.	Snap	Removal	Rate	Over	Time	(Clustered)	
 
We remind the reader that our dataset excluded snap removal cases authored by district judges 
once they were bound by circuit precedent. Naturally, once that happened the removal rate in 
each of those jurisdictions was 100%. Even in our dataset, however, removal rates are rising. 
After five consecutive years with annual removal rates at or below 50% nationwide, the last two 
years were notably higher. The removal rates in 2018 and 2019 were 63% (n=16) and 56% 
(n=16), respectively. For the narrow slice of 2020 included in our dataset the removal rate is 
100% (n=3). 
 
2. Geography 
 
Snap removal is not a nationwide phenomenon. As depicted in figure 2, the issue was 
relatively dormant in nearly half of all states.66 Six states account for 53% of the cases in our 
dataset; of these six high-frequency states, four are located in circuits that now have binding 
precedent on the propriety of snap removal.67 Figure 2, below, captures the frequency at which 
the issue of snap removal was raised, not the rate at which it was granted. 
																																								 																				
66 Out dataset includes no cases from Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. And 
there is only one case from each of Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Montana, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
67 California, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas account for 122 of the 232 cases depicted 
in figure 2. 
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Figure	2.	Geographic	Distribution	of	Snap	Removal	Cases	
 
When reporting our data we occasionally are able to use one of our larger datasets. In figure 2, 
for example, we have included not only the 193 cases that form the core of our dataset, but an 
additional 39 opinions that were authored by judges who authored another opinion that was 
already included within the core dataset. Although the additional 39 cases were not first 
impressions, they are properly part of a frequency metric.68 
There are several possible contributing explanations for a concentration of snap removal 
cases in certain geographic areas and an absence of such cases in other areas. First, a state’s 
service practice and procedure can affect the likelihood of snap removal. Specifically, in some 
states, a civil action commences upon service, rather than filing.69 This distinction minimizes the 
traps for the plaintiff’s lawyer who is unwary of the snap removal phenomenon. In these states, 
an action is not removable until some defendant is served;70 so, provided the forum defendant is 
served first or is served contemporaneously with non-forum defendants, there is no window for a 
snap removal. By contrast, in states where a civil action commences upon filing, the action is 
removable from the moment of filing and continues to be removable until the forum defendant is 
served.  
 
State practice and procedure can also make snap removal more likely. In New Jersey, for 
example, actions commence upon filing, and even savvy plaintiffs’ lawyers cannot serve the 
defendant immediately to prevent snap removals. Rather, plaintiffs’ lawyers must first wait up to 
10 days for a Track Assignment Notice to be issued by the clerk.71 Similarly in jurisdictions like 
Pennsylvania that require process to be served by the sheriff, plaintiffs’ lawyers cannot use 
private process-servers to minimize the time-window for a snap removal.72  
 
																																								 																				
68 These 232 cases do not include snap removal cases that were decided by district judges under binding circuit court 
precedent.  
69 See, e.g. Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01(a); N.D. R. Civ. P. 3; Wash. Civ. R. 3. Note that there are also states where actions 
commence upon filing and yet snap removals are rare. See, e.g., Alk. R. Civ. P. 3; Ark. R. Civ. P. 3(a); Iowa R. Civ. 
P. 1.301. 
70	Federal practice and procedure allows removal of an action, but there is no action to be removed until it has 
commenced (according to state law).	
71 See N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:5A-2. See also N.Y. Civ. P. L. & R. 304 & 306 (clerk must issue an “index number” before 
process may be served).  
72 Pa. R. Civ. P. 400(a) (“original process shall be served with the Commonwealth only by the sheriff,” who has 30 
days to effect service). See also La. C.C.P. Art. 1291 (“service shall be made by the sheriff”). 
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Second, geographic variance with respect to snap removal may be explained, in part, by a 
corresponding geographic variation in certain types of litigation and litigants. For example, more 
than 30% of the cases in our dataset involve defendants who manufacture pharmaceuticals or 
medical devices.73 Many of these companies are located in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
California, and thus are frequently defending suits there.74 Conferences and publications that 
target this cohort of repeat-players in litigation may have popularized snap removal.75 
 
A third and somewhat similar possible explanation for geographic variance is different legal 
cultures. Snap removal is something of a trick: it elevates form over substance, and it is 
something that, practically speaking, only rich defendants do. That is not a recipe for success in 
some regions of the country. Informal conversations with practitioners confirm this. One senior 
partner at a major law firm in Boston told us, for example, that he would never try snap-
																																								 																				
73 These defendants include Abbot Labs., Actavis Pharma, Alza Corp.., Amgen Inc., Apotex Inc., AstraZeneca plc, 
Bayer AG, Biogen Inc., Bio-Reference Labs., Inc., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., ConMed Linvatec, Daiichi Sankyo 
Co., Ltd., DuPont de Nemours & Co., Eli Lilly & Co., ExeGi Pharma, LLC, Eon Labs, Inc., Gilead Sciences, Inc., 
GlaxoSmithKline plc, F Hoffmann-Laroche AG,  Janssen Pharmaceutica, Johnson & Johnson, MDS Inc., Mc 
Kesson Corp., Medtronic plc, Merck & Co., Inc., Novartis Intl. AG, Organon Pharmaceuticals, Pfizer Inc., Schering-
Plough Corp., Wright Med. Grp. N.V., and Wyeth, LLC. 
See also Sopko, supra, at *29 n.201 (citing James M. Beck, What’s Up With Removal Before Service?, Drug & 
Device Law (May 26, 2011), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2011/05/whats-up-with-removal-before-
service.html [https://perma.cc/GM8M-SP28] (observing in a Westlaw search of snap removal cases that “more than 
half of the cases … didn’t involve drugs and devices,” which benefits corporate defendants since significant use of 
the tact by corporations outside the pharmaceutical industry makes it “harder for the other side to characterize it as 
some sort of procedural gimmick that shouldn’t be allowed.”)). Sopko’s article also includes an appendix that 
catalogues which law firms are employing snap removal. Of the 274 snap removal cases in his dataset, more than 
75% of the defendants were represented by one of three firms, namely Fox Rothschild (125), Riker Danzig (68), or 
Husch Blackwell (20). See id. at __ tbl 6. 
74 For example, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Merck & Co., Novartis Intl. AG and many other companies have a 
substantial presence in New Jersey. AstraZeneca plc, Pfizer Inc., Johnson & Johnson and others are in Pennsylvania. 
Amgen Inc., Bayer AG, Gilead Sciences, Inc., GlaxoSmithKline plc, and others are in California.  
75 See, e.g., John P. Lavelle, Jr. & Erin E. Kepplinger, Removal Prior to Service: A New Wrinkle or a Dead End?, 75 
DEF. COUNS. J. 177 (Winter 2008); Zach Hughes, A New Argument Supporting Removal of Diversity Cases Prior to 
Service, 79 DEF. COUNS. J 205, 212 (2012); James M. Beck, Making it Snappy in New York, Drug & Device Law 
Blog, available at https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2020/05/making-it-snappy-in-new-york.html (last visited 
July 3, 2020); James M. Beck, How’d the World Miss This? Thomson v. Novartis, DRUG & DEVICE LAW BLOG, 
Nov. 25, 2007, available at https://www.drug anddevicelawblog.com/2007/11/howd-world-miss-this-thomson-v-
novartis.html (last visited June 3, 2020); Katie A. Fillmore, Third Circuit Recognizes Viability of Snap Removal by 
in-State Defendant, 30 PRODUCTS LIAB. 15 (2019); John Polzer & Derek Carson, “Oh Snap!” A Loophole Around 
the Forum-Defendant Rule, Dallas Bar Association, Sept. 26, 2018, available at https://www.dallasbar.org/book-
page/%E2%80%9Coh-snap%E2%80%9D-loophole-around-forum-defendant-rule (last visited June 3, 2020); 
Lindsay C. Omolecki, Safe at Home: Preservice Removal and the Forum Defendant Rule, 29 PRODUCTS LIAB. 1 
(2018); Molly E. Flynn & Christopher D. Liwski, Looking Beyond Removal: Procedural Tactics in Plaintiff-
Friendly Jurisdictions When Removal Is Not an Option, 10 No. 3 DRIIDQ 21 (2015); Alicia A. Baiardo, Snap 
Removals—An Often Unconsidered Path to Federal Court, McGuire Woods, available at 
https://www.classactioncountermeasures.com/2019/01/articles/strategy/snap-removals-an-often-unconsidered-path-
to-federal-court/ (last visited July 3, 2020); Paul Werner & Abraham Shanedling, Second Circuit Affirms “Snap” 
Removal Practice, CLASS ACTION DEFENSE STRATEGY BLOG, available at 
https://www.classactiondefensestrategy.com/2019/03/articles/federal-class-action/snap-removal-mdl/ (last visited 
July 3, 2020). 
Adam Sopko has collected many more examples of law firms boasting about their effective use of snap 
removal. See Sopko, supra, at *28-*29. 
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removing a case there because such hijinks would infuriate the judge.76 There are four snap 
removal cases from Massachusetts in our expanded dataset, and in all four instances the cases 
were remanded.77 Naturally, the earliest cases on a subject like snap removal could reflect or 
create a culture that discourages tactics like snap removal.78 In this vein, it may be noteworthy 
that there was no Massachusetts snap removal case (in our dataset) after 2016.79 
 
A fourth explanation for the geographic variation could be selection bias by judges and the 
online legal publishers that influences which published and unpublished opinions appear in 
commercial legal databases.  Many choices that judges make, particularly at the district court 
level, impact the likelihood that a particular opinion or order will later appear in a commercial 
legal database.80  Such choices include:  deciding whether the decision will be a formal, written 
opinion, a memorandum opinion, a summary order, or an oral announcement from the bench,81 
labeling an opinion as a “Written Opinion” in PACER, designating it for publication, and 
deciding whether to send the opinion to Westlaw or Lexis.82  Local court practices and court 
culture are among the factors that can influence the form of judicial determinations and lead to 
geographic variations.83  Such determinations in turn impact the universe of cases available to 
																																								 																				
76 Conversation with Bruce Falby, DLA Piper, Boston, Massachusetts. [Probably doesn’t want to be named 
publicly.] 
77 Gentile v. Biogen Idec, Inc., 934 F.Supp.2d 313 (2013) (Woodlock, J.); Howard v. Genentech, Inc., 2013 WL 
680200 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 2013) (Woodlock, J.); Adams v. Beacon Hill Staffing Group, 2015 WL 6182468 (D. 
Mass. Oct. 21, 2015) (Burroughs, J.); Rizzi v. 178 Lowell Street Operating Co., LLC, 180 F.Supp.3d 66 (2016) 
(Gorton, J.). 
78 The first two opinions on snap removal in Massachusetts were authored by Judge Douglas Woodlock in 2013. 
Judge Woodlock was then (and remains) a highly regarded and experienced judge. Query whether his rejection of 
snap removal had ripple effects beyond his courtroom; that is, if Judge Woodlock wouldn’t allow snap removal, the 
perception might have been that no judge in that courthouse would. After all, Judge Woodlock was an elite-
educated, former big-firm lawyer and Assistant U.S. Attorney, who was appointed by President Reagan. 
79 Similarly, in Arizona, there are three snap removal cases and, as in Massachusetts, all were remanded. The most 
recent of these decisions was in 2011. See Traslavina v. MDS Pharma Servs. Inc., 2011 WL 2132880 (D. Ariz. May 
27, 2011) (remanding action to state court); Rodriguez v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2010 WL 11519175 (D. Ariz. 
Jan. 22, 2010) (same); Ibarra v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 2009 WL 1651292 (D. Ariz. June 12, 2009) (same). In New 
Mexico, the only opinion on snap removal was published in 2013. See Lone Mountain v. Santa Fe Gold, 988 
F.Supp.2d 1263 (D.N.M. 2013) (remanding action to state court). 
However, there are also districts where the only decisions have allowed snap removal, yet there are no recent 
cases. In Montana, for example, the only case on the subject allowed snap removal in 2012. See Mahana v. Enerplus 
Resources U.S.A. Corp., 2012 WL 1947101 (D. Mont. May 30, 2012) (denying remand motion). See also Chace v. 
Bryant, 2010 WL 4496800 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 1, 2010) (denying remand motion). 
80 See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV. L.J. 515, 536 (“In their role as decision-makers, 
judges must decide whether to write, how much to write, what form their writing should take, and whether to 
broadcast their writing, all of which respond to the circumstances of individual cases and invoke judges’ discretion 
to manage cases. . . . The initial choice to hold hearings or decide an issue on paper has some bearing on the 
submergence of any decision resulting from this choice.”) 
81 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL 3 (2d ed. 2013); Christina Boyd, Opinion Writing in the 
Federal District Courts, 36 JUSTICE SYSTEM J. 254, 254 (2015). 
82 See McCuskey, supra, 16 NEV. L.J. at 537. 
83 See, e.g., id. at 538-39 (discussing the decreased availability in Westlaw of certain opinions from the Northern 
District of Illinois due to the use of a particular order form utilized in that district from 2005 to 2014); Brian Lizotte, 
Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of Summary Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 
107, 143 (“Although difficult to quantify, local norms may create categorical regional differences in publication 
practice. . .”); Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 83, 97 (2009) (noting how publication decisions “may depend upon formal rules, court culture, personal 
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commercial publishers who frequently rely on designations, such as “Written Opinion” in 
PACER and opinions recommended by judges.84  On top of this, commercial publishers also 
make strategic, discretionary choices to include cases in their databases.85  Commercial 
publishers also may be influenced by the needs and demands of certain legal markets that “may 
drive publication channels to give some issues and courts greater attention.”86  All of these 
factors play important roles in the overall availability of written legal opinions and also 
contribute to geographic variations. 
 
Importantly, the concentration of cases into states and regions was not necessarily correlated 
with countenance of snap removal. Nor do the judges within a state or judicial district tend to 
agree about the propriety of snap removal. The following examples are offered to illustrate both 
the variance of removal rates across jurisdictions and the lack of unanimity within most 
jurisdictions.87 
Figure	3.	Snap	Removal	Rate	
in	Selected	States	
Arizona	 0%	(n=3)	
Kentucky	 25%	(n=4)	
Maryland	 29%	(n=7)	
Missouri	 36%	(n=14)	
New	York	 36%	(n=14)	
New	Jersey	 47%	(n=15)	
Florida	 63%	(n=8)	
Illinois	 63%	(n=8)	
California	 64%	(n=25)	
Texas	 79%	(n=14)	
West	Virginia	 80%	(n=5)	
Louisiana	 100%	(n=8)	
Again, our core dataset did not include cases decided after the issuance of binding circuit 
precedent. Accordingly, the numbers reported for New York, New Jersey, Texas, and Louisiana 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
predilections, or strategic considerations”); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An 
Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 700-701 (2009) (“Different jurisdictions, however, have markedly 
different practices with respect to publication . . .”).  There are, of course, other influential factors that are discussed 
extensively elsewhere.  See, e.g., McCuskey, supra, 16 NEV. L.J. at 535 (discussing “judges’ managerial discretion, 
the technology used to collect and access law, the structure of the substantive law applied, a decision’s appealability, 
and the sophistication of the parties”); Lizotte, supra, 2007 WIS. L. REV. at 138-45 (discussing several “biases in the 
publication decision”). 
84 See McCuskey, supra, 16 NEV. L.J. at 537-38, 539; see also Thomas Reuters, Submission Guidelines for Court 
Opinions, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/solutions/government/court-opinion-submission-guidelines (last 
visited July 31, 2020) (providing instructions and guidelines for judges for forwarding opinions for print and online 
publication). 
85 See McCuskey, supra, 16 NEV. L.J. at 537-38; see also Leong, supra, 36 PEPP. L. REV at 701 (discussing 
Westlaw’s selection process and varying rates of including cases across jurisdictions). 
86 See Lizotte, supra, 2007 WIS. L. REV. at 143.	
87 In figure 3 we have returned to the core dataset (of 193 cases), because a state’s removal rate is more accurately 
captured by excluding multiple cases decided by a single judge.  
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in figure 3 include only district court cases decided before the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits, 
respectively, allowed snap removal.88 
 
3. Publication 
 
Our dataset included snap removal opinions that were published, as well as opinions that 
were formally “unpublished” though published by online commercial vendors.89 The rate at 
which opinions are (formally) published is, at minimum, intriguing trivia. But we also observed 
evidence of ideology at work. 
 
Approximately 28% of the opinions in our dataset were (formally) published. Figure 4 
presents raw annual data for published and unpublished opinions. 
Figure	4.	Annual	Published	and	Unpublished	
Snap	Removal	Opinions	
 
The criteria for publishing an opinion vary by jurisdiction but often reflect standards 
recommended in a 1973 Federal Judicial Center’s Advisory Council on Appellate Justices’ 
report.90  An opinion should not be published unless it “lays down a new rule of law, or alters or 
modifies an existing rule . . . involves a legal issue of continuing public interest . . . criticizes 
existing law . . . [or] resolves an apparent conflict of authority.”91  Similarly, Westlaw 
																																								 																				
88 See TAN __, supra [cites for Gibbons, Stone Mansion, and Texas Brine]. 
89 To be clear, “snap removal opinions” include those where snap removal was allowed and those where it was 
disallowed. 
90 See Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFORM 119, 125 (1994). 
91 Comm. on Use of Appellate Court Energies of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, Standards for 
Publication of Judicial Opinions, FJC Research Series No. 73-2, at 15-17 (1973).  For circuit courts, the criteria for 
publishing an opinion are often prescribed in their local rules.  See Joseph L. Gerken, A Librarian’s Guide to 
Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 L. LIBR. J. 475, 480 (2004); see also Criteria for Publication, in 2A FEDERAL 
PROCEDURE, L. ED. § 3:916 (June 2020 update).  For district courts, “the decision to publish is entirely in the judge’s 
discretion,” FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 7 (2d. ed. 
2013), but criteria similar to those in the Federal Judicial Center report and Westlaw’s publication submission 
guidelines likely guide publication practices for district courts, as well.  See Hillel Levin, Making the Law: 
Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973, n. 76 (2008); Karen Swenson, Federal District Court 
Judges and the Decision to Publish, 25 JUSTICE SYSTEM J. 121, 121 (2004). 
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encourages federal judges to submit opinions for publication that are “of general interest and 
importance to the bench and bar, such as those that: deal with an issue of first impression; 
establish, alter, modify, or explain a rule of law; provide a review of the law; involve unique 
factual situations; present a unique holding; [or] involve newsworthy cases.”92 
 
In light of such publication guidelines, one might fairly expect a greater percentage of these 
opinions to have been slated for publication. After all, the interpretation of the forum defendant 
rule is a pure question of law. Broadly circulating the ruling, then, would be useful and could 
have positive externalities—possibly to help spread an ideology, but that would not be the only 
reason. The issue of snap removal is important: the interpretation of this statute resolves a 
substantial question about the availability of a federal forum. There was no binding precedential 
authority in any of the cases (in our dataset); so this was not a routine matter that was unworthy 
of broader circulation. Yet in nearly three out of every four cases, the judge’s order or opinion 
was unpublished and hidden behind an online paywall. In addition to cost, another consequence 
of an opinion being unpublished is that it may be treated as only persuasive, rather than 
precedential, authority, and depending on the date it was issued, may not be cited at all in some 
jurisdictions.93 
 
One possible explanation for this practice is collegiality and deference. Publishing an opinion 
that agrees with a colleague’s interpretation might seem unnecessary, and publishing an opinion 
that disagrees might seem discourteous. These suppositions seem unlikely given the 
independence of judges and the absence of (horizontal) stare decisis. Yet it is at least conceivable 
that this might explain why, for example, a federal judge in Hawaii could decide not to publish 
his decision rejecting snap removal when two of his colleagues had, in prior years, allowed it.94 
However, in many jurisdictions, even the first opinion on snap removal was not published.95 
Collegiality cannot readily explain this mystery. 
 
We explored the possibility that publication rates were low because district judges within a 
district would coalesce around either a pro- or anti- snap removal position, and would thus view 
the matter as routine and therefore unworthy of publication. But there is little evidence for this in 
light of the lack of consensus within jurisdictions, as illustrated in figure 3 above. Indeed, 
Louisiana is the only state where both of the following conditions were true: (i) there were at 
																																								 																				
92 Thomas Reuters, Submission Guidelines for Court Opinions, 
https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/solutions/government/court-opinion-submission-guidelines (last visited July 1, 
2020).	
93 The adoption of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 helped provide some uniformity across circuits in 
allowing citations to unpublished federal judicial opinions issued on or after January 1, 2007.  However, Rule 32.1 is 
very limited in scope: “It does not prescribe rules for determining when a decision should be published.  It does not 
require courts to permit citation of unpublished opinions issued prior to 2007.  And it does not prescribe the 
precedential value, if any, of unpublished opinions.  Circuits take varying approaches to all these questions, and 
practitioners should be sure to consult the local rules of the relevant circuit.”  Citing Unpublished Opinions, in 
16AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3978.10 (Apr. 2020 update). 
94 U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Martin, 2015 WL 2227792 (D. Haw. Apr. 23, 2015); Deutsche Bank v. Hagan, 2015 WL 
7720465 (D. Haw. Nov. 27, 2015) Watanabe v. Lankford, 684 F.Supp.2d 1210 (D. Haw. 2010) (allowing removal). 
95 See, e.g., Maple Leaf Bakery v. Raychem, 1999 WL 1101326 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 1999); Johnson v. Precision 
Airmotive, LLC, 2007 WL 4289656 (Dec. 4, 2007); FTS Intern. Servs., LLC v. Caldwell-Baker Co., 2013 WL 
1305330 (D. Kans. Mar. 27, 2013). But see Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 314 F.Supp.2d 177 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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least four opinions from the state; and (ii) all of the state’s opinions concurred on the availability 
vel non of snap removal.  
 
With respect to the issuance of a published opinion, we saw no patterns. In jurisdictions 
where one judge published an opinion allowing snap removal, there were usually subsequent 
cases where judges rejected snap removal. In California, for example, there were two published 
(plus two unpublished) opinions allowing snap removal before the first (of nine) unpublished 
opinion(s) rejecting it.96 Although less common, there were examples of the mirror situation: In 
Maryland there have been three published (plus two unpublished) opinions rejecting snap 
removal, yet two judges have authored unpublished opinions allowing it.97 There were several 
districts with published opinions on each side of the divide,98 and some with only unpublished 
opinions on each side.99 
 
At first blush, the judges’ decision to publish appeared not to be correlated with the decision 
to allow or disallow snap removal. Figure 5 reveals nearly identical publication rates for remands 
and removals. 
Figure	5.	Publication	Rate	for	
Remands	and	Removals	
x2	=	0.022;	p	=	.882	
Remands	 27%	(25/91)	
Removals	 28%	(29/102)	
The woefully small chi square value generated a very high p value.100 The p value suggests that 
there is an 88.2% chance that the null hypothesis is true, to-wit: there is no statistical correlation 
between the decision to publish and the outcome in the case. 
 
Yet figure 5 does not tell the whole story—for reasons that are a harbinger of things to come 
in this article. To be sure, the decision to publish was not correlated with case outcomes when 
																																								 																				
96	See Republic Western Ins. Co. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (allowing snap removal); Cucci 
v. Edwards, 510 F.Supp.2d 479 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (same); City of Ann Arbor Employees Retirement System v. 
Gecht, 2007 WL 760568 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007) (same); Waldon v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 2007 WL 1747128 
(N.D. Cal. June 18, 2007) (same); Mohammed v. Watson Pharms. Inc., 2009 WL 857517 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2009) 
(remanding).	
97 To be clear, only the first of the published opinions preceded the two unpublished opinions. Opinions rejecting 
snap removal were issued in 2002 (publ.), 2015 (publ.), 2016 (unpubl.), 2017 (publ.), and 2019 (unpubl.). The 
opinions allowing snap removal were issued in 2011 and 2015, respectively. 
98 In the Northern District of Illinois, for example, there are two published opinions allowing snap removal and two 
published opinions rejecting it. See Vivas v. Boeing Co., 485 F.Supp.2d 726 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (remanding); In re 
Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Lia. Litig., 67 F.Supp.3d 952 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (remanding); Graff v. 
Leslie Hindman Auctioneers, Inc., 299 F.Supp.3d 928 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (denying remand); DC by Cheatham v. 
Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 325 F.Supp.3d 991 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (denying remand). 
99 See, e.g., Stefan v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, et al., 2013 WL 6354588 (D. Del. Dec. 6, 2013) (remanding); Laugell v. 
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 2012 WL 368229 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2012) (remanding); Munchell v. Wyeth LLC, 2012 
WL 4050071 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2012) (denying remand). 
100 A chi square test tests the likelihood that an observed distribution is attributable to chance. It is designed to 
analyze categorical (as opposed to parametric or continuous) data. The tests compares the observed data to a model 
that distributes the data according to the expectation (or null hypothesis) that the variables are independent. The chi 
square value is used in combination with the degrees of freedom) to calculate a p value. See generally DAVID R. 
ANDERSON ET AL., STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS & ECONOMICS (14th ed. 2019).	
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other variables were held constant. Yet there were interactions with other variables, as 
demonstrated in figure 6, below. Here we introduce the concept of party effects which we 
discuss throughout the paper. Party refers to the party of the President who appointed the judge. 
Using this proxy, we often refer to “Democratic judges” and “Republican judges” throughout.101 
Figure	6.	Publication	Rate	for	
Remands	and	Removals,	with	Party	Effects	(Table)	
	
	 Democrats	
x2	=	3.338;	p	=	.068*	
Republicans	
x2	=	2.662;	p	=	.103	
Remands	 32%	(17/53)	 21%	(8/38)	
Removals	 18%	(6/39)	 37%	(23/63)	
	 25%	 31%	
Although the publication rates for Democratic and Republican judges were substantially similar 
(25% v. 31%), figure 6 reveals what is referred to as a crossover (or disordinal) interaction. 
Figure 7, below, illustrates that interaction graphically by combining the data from figures 5 and 
6. 
Figure	7.	Publication	Rate	for	
Remands	and	Removals,	with	Party	Effects	(Bar	Graph)	
 
In figure 7 the middle set of bars represents the publication rate for remanded and removed cases 
(by Democratic and Republican judges combined); these are the numbers represented in figure 5 
where there was an 88.2% chance that there is no statistical correlation between the decision to 
publish and the outcome in the case. The sets of bars on the left and right sides are subgroups for 
Democratic and Republican judges, respectively. As reported in figure 6, within each of these 
subgroups there was a strong correlation between the decision to publish and the outcome in the 
case. The p values were .068 and .103, respectively. With the relatively small sample size of our 
dataset, we flag p values below .10 with one star to indicate statistical significance, p values 
below .05 with two stars, and p values below .01 with three stars.102 
																																								 																				
101 We discuss this conventional practice more thoroughly at TAN ___ [Section B.1/party effects] 
102 Null hypothesis testing typically sets the decision-making threshold of statistical significance at .05. But .10 can 
be an acceptable tolerance for small sample sizes like ours. The risk of a higher tolerance is the possibility of more 
type 1 errors. See Joseph F. Mudge et al., Setting an Optimal α That Minimizes Errors in Null Hypothesis 
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The decision to publish was thus correlated with case outcomes, but that correlation ran in 
opposite directions for Republicans and Democrats, respectively.103 Specifically, although 
Democrats published 25% of their opinions, they published 32% of their remands and only 18% 
of their removals. Republicans, on the other hand, published 31% of their opinions, but only 21% 
of their remands and 37% of their removals. This phenomenon likely reflects some desire to 
influence other judges and/or future litigants. Alternatively, the decision to publish may indicate 
a judge’s higher level of satisfaction (whether visceral or ardent) with the opinion’s reasoning or 
conclusion. Whether proselytizing or peacocking is more descriptive, ideology was correlated 
with a judge’s decision to publish. 
 
B. Specific Variables 
 
In this Part we report the results of our empirical study of several variables as predictors of 
textualism in the context of snap removal. The most important variable was the party of the 
President who appointed the judge. This variable proved important in two different respects. 
First, its predictive power was higher than any other variable we studied. That analysis appears 
in the first section. Second, and much more subtly, we observed this party effect in several of the 
other variables that we analyze in sections two through seven of this Part. Whether some of these 
other variables had predictive value was conditioned upon whether the judges were appointed by 
Republicans or Democrats. This is the “party effect” first observed in the context of publication 
decisions, as discussed in Part III.A.3, supra.  
 
1. Party of President Who Appointed Judge 
 
The best single predictor of a textualist case outcome was the party of the president who 
appointed the judge. Unsurprisingly, judges appointed by Republican presidents were more 
likely to allow snap removal than judges appointed by Democratic presidents. We say 
unsurprisingly because textualism is strongly associated with Republicans (since President 
Reagan),104 and purposivism with Democratic judges.105 Using the party of the appointing 
president as a proxy for the ideological preference of judges is a routine practice.106 And it is a 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Significance Tests, PLoS One 7(2) (2012) e32734 (describing disadvantages in consistently relying on the traditional 
but arbitrary significance level of .05). 
103 The correlation between the decision to publish and the outcome in the case for all judges (combined) was not 
statistically significant because the correlation was masked by a cancellation of the oppositional forces of the two 
subgroups—one establishing correlation between publication and remand, and the other establishing correlation 
between publication and removal. 
104 See, e.g., Abramowicz & Tiller, supra, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. at 436; Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An 
Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 28 (1998); Steven R. 
Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 37, 51-52 (1991); Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, and a Misleading Version of 
Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 582, 591 (1991); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New 
Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1599 (1991). 
105 Kerr, supra, 15 YALE J. ON REG. at 28; Stempel, supra, 22 U. TOL L. REV. at 590-598; Abramowicz & Tiller, 
supra, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. at 436. 
106 See, e.g., Abramowicz & Tiller, supra, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. at 423; Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on 
Federal Courts of Appeal: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 305 (2004); Daniel R. Pinnello, Linking 
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routine practice because it has been empirically substantiated in many studies.107 That said, our 
study adds something new to that literature. Although it is generally accepted that ideology can 
help explain judicial outcomes at the appellate level, many have suggested—and verified—that 
there are fewer or no party effects at the trial court level.108 To the extent that we demonstrate 
party effects here and throughout this paper, we offer a counterexample to that conventional 
wisdom. 
 
Figure 8 below, presents the basic tally. This difference in the rate of removal was 
statistically significant at the highest level. 
Figure	8.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by	
Party	of	Appointing	President	
x2	(1,	n=193)	=	7.717;	p	=	.005***	
Republicans	 62%	(63/101)	
Democrats	 42%	(39/92)	
An odds ratio is sometimes a more useful way to analyze correlation amid categorical 
outcomes.109 The odds of removal by a Republican judge were 2.25 times greater than the odds 
of removal by a Democratic judge.110 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999); Richard L. Revesz, 
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1718 n.6 (1997). 
107 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of 
Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 302 (“democratic D.C. 
Circuit judges are more likely to reverse agency policies at the behest of individuals, and republican D.C. Circuit 
judges are more likely to reverse agency policies challenged by business interests”); see also TAN ___,___, ___, 
supra / infra.  
108 See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case 
Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995) (finding that judges’ political preferences do not affect the outcome 
of summary judgment motions in civil rights cases); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action 
Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 840-41 (2010) (finding no effect of the 
judges’ political party on class action settlements and their fee awards); Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice 
or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 193 (2010) (finding that the “party of the deciding judge bears no relation to 
outcome”). 
109 Odds ratios are particularly useful in logistic regression—and with dichotomous variables more generally—
because they approximate how much more likely or unlikely (in terms of odds) it is for the outcome to be present 
among those subjects where the dummy variable of x equals 1 compared to those where it equals 0. See generally  
Also, for polychotomous or continuous independent variables (see TAN ___, supra [Part III.B.5]), an odds ratio 
represents the constant effect of an independent variable on a predicted outcome. If the effect is represented as a 
probability (rather than as odds) the effect is not constant. See also TAN __ [+1], infra. 
110 For the uninitiated, odds are not probabilities. Probability is the ratio between the number of events favorable to 
some outcome and the total number of events. By contrast, odds are the ratio between probabilities: the probability 
of an event favorable to an outcome and the probability of an event against the same outcome. Probability is 
constrained between zero and one, while odds are constrained only between zero and infinity. An odds ratio is the 
ratio between odds.  
The odds of removal by a judge who was appointed by a Republican president were 63/38 = 1.658. The odds of 
removal by a judge who was appointed by a Democratic president were 39/53 = .736.  The ratio of these odds is 
1.658 / .736 = 2.25.  
Odds can be converted into probabilities by dividing the odds by (1 + odds). Thus the probability of a 
Republican judge removing is 1.658 / (1 + 1.658) = .62. 
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Moreover, there is evidence that party effects may be getting stronger. In figure 9, below, we 
report the removal rates for judges when sorted by their appointing President. The darker shading 
distinguishes Republicans from Democrats.  
Figure	9.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by	
Appointing	President	
L.	Johnson	 *	(1/1)	
R.	Nixon	 *	(3/4)	
G.	Ford	 *	(1/1)	
J.	Carter	 25%	(2/8)	
R.	Reagan	 68%	(13/19)	
G.H.W.	Bush	 48%	(13/27)	
W.	Clinton	 49%	(20/41)	
G.W.	Bush	 65%	(30/46)	
B.	Obama	 38%	(16/42)	
D.	Trump	 * (3/4) 
Judges appointed by President Obama had lower removal rates (38%) than judges appointed by 
the Democratic president who immediately preceded him (49%). And judges appointed by 
President George W. Bush had higher removal rates (65%) than judges appointed by the 
Republican president who immediately preceded him (48%).111 These trends portend more 
polarization as the Obama and the younger Bush judges (plus the President Trump judges) 
decide more of the forthcoming snap removal cases (and as the Clinton and elder Bush judges 
decide fewer). We expect that to happen soon since the turnover on the District Court bench 
occurs rapidly.112 Given the large number of judicial appointments from the current Republican 
president, we would expect the rate of successful snap removals to steadily increase in the short 
term. We discuss this more thoroughly in Part III.C, infra.113 
The fairly recent party polarization on the issue of snap removal is apparent also in figure 10, 
below. This graph is the same as figure 1 except that figure 1 combined Republican and 
Democratic judges into a single line graph. Figure 10 shows the compositional subgroups. 
																																								 																				
111 This polarization in judicial ideology, which has been documented in numerous contexts, is generally thought to 
have begun with President Reagan. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND 
REFORM 18 (1996) (describing President Reagan’s aggressive efforts to rebalance the bench after “notably liberal” 
judges appointed by President Carter). But see Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, All the President’s Men? A 
Study of Ronald Reagan’s Appointment to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1987) (examination 
of Reagan circuit court appointees suggests comparatively little difference in views relatively to predecessors). 
112 As of May 1, 2020, there were 260 active district court judges appointed by President Obama on the bench, 
compared to only 55 appointed by President Clinton. And there were 130 active district court judges appointed by 
President George W. Bush on the bench, compared to only 8 appointed by President George H.W. Bush. President 
Trump has appointed 145 active district court judges who have begun service; another 42 are in various pending 
stages. See Law360’s Guide to Trump’s Judicial Picks, LAW360.COM (originally published Sept. 12, 2019, updated 
July 28, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/963060/law360-s-guide-to-trump-s-judicial-picks. 
113 See TAN ___, infra [Figures 40.1, 40.2, 40.3, and 40.4]. 
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Figure	10.	Snap	Removal	Rate	Over	Time	(Clustered),	
with	Party	Effects	
	
Although there was only modest separation between Republican and Democratic removal rates 
for a decade, since 2016 the difference was glaring. And it is growing: since the start of calendar 
year 2019, the Republican removal rate was 100% (n=8) and the Democratic removal rate was 
36% (n=11). 
 
2. Gender of Judge 
 
Next we consider gender effects in outcomes while controlling for all other variables. The 
gender of the judge appeared to have some predictive value with respect to textualist outcomes. 
As indicated in figure 11, below, women judges were more likely than men to allow snap 
removal. 
Figure	11.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by	Gender	
x2	=	1.559;	p	=	.212	
Women	 61%	(28/46)	
Men	 50%	(74/147)	
Again, odds ratios can illuminate relationships between and among categorical variables. The 
odds of a female judge permitting snap removal were about 1.5 (or 3:2) times greater than the 
odds of a male judge allowing it.114 This difference does not, however, register as statistically 
significant. With a p score of .212, there is roughly a 21% chance that this differential could be 
observed even if our null hypothesis were true, to-wit: that there is no correlation between gender 
and removal rates. To be sure, the relatively small number of opinions by female judges (n=46) 
made it harder to find statistical significance.115 
There was also nuance to this gender effect. Or, put another way, there were two different 
gender effects, namely Republican women and Democratic women. Figure 12, below, tracks 
both of these cohorts. 
																																								 																				
114 The odds of removal by a female judge were 28/18 = 1.56. The odds of removal by a male judge were 74/73 = 
1.01. The ratio of these odds is 1.56/1.01 = 1.54. 
115 By contrast, with the party effects variable, we had 92 and 101 datapoints in each group.  
1991=2005
(n=7,5)
2006-2010
(n=26,19)
2011-2015
(n=42,28)
2016-2020
(n=26,40)
Rep. 86% 65% 48% 77%
Dem. 40% 63% 39% 35%
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Figure	12.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by	Gender,	
with	Party	Effects	(Table)	
	 Democrats	
x2	=	.269;	p	=	.604	
Republicans	
x2	=	4.099;	p	=	.043**	
Females	 46%	(13/28)	 83%	(15/18)	
Males	 41%	(26/64)	 58%	(48/83)	
These data indicate that there was a very small gender effect among Democrats, but a strong and 
statistically-significant effect among Republicans. The odds of a Republican female judge 
allowing snap removal were 7.3 times greater than the odds of a Democratic male judge allowing 
it.116 The odds of Republican female judge allowing snap removal were 3.6 times greater than 
the odds of a Republican male judge allowing it.117 Figure 13 further elaborates this gender 
effect. 
Figure	13.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by	Gender,	
with	Party	Effects	(Bar	Graph)	
 
The middle set of bars report the data presented in figure 11. The sets of bars on the left and right 
sides are subgroups for Democratic and Republican judges, respectively, as reported in figure 12. 
To be clear this was not the sort of crossover interaction discussed in Part III.A.3, supra. Here 
the winds of the gender effect blew in only one direction, with a breeze for Democrats and a gust 
for Republicans. The direction was toward more textualist outcomes. 
 
Thus, even if not overwhelming, the variable of gender was important. Gender alone as a 
separate variable was compelling but not statistically significant. But gender with party effects 
revealed something more subtle. Democratic women were only slightly more likely than 
Democratic men to remove. But Republican women were substantially more likely than 
Republican men to remove.  
 
																																								 																				
116 The odds of a Republican female judge allowing removal were 15 / 3 = 5. The odds of a Democrat male judge 
allowing removal were 26 / 38 = .684. The odds ratio is 5 / .684 = 7.310. 
117 The odds of a Republican female judge allowing removal were 15 / 3 = 5. The odds of a Republican male judge 
allowing removal were 48 / 35 = 1.371. The odds ratio is 5 / 1.371 = 3.647. 
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3. Race of Judge 
 
Testing for race effects required the admittedly crass act of combining all of the non-White 
races into a single cluster in order to assemble a sufficiently large sample. This gave us a set of 
44 cases, a number worthy of meaningful study. The data are presented in figure 14, below. 
Figure	14.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Race	(Clustered)	
x2	=	.063;	p	=	.802	
Non-White	 51%	(22/43)	
White	 53%	(80/150)	
This was decidedly uninteresting from a statistical perspective. 
 
There was some intriguing evidence, however, that racial diversity moderated party effects. 
As indicated in figures 15 and 16, below, non-white Democrats were more inclined to allow snap 
removal than other Democrats, and non-white Republicans were less inclined to allow snap 
removal than other Republicans. 
Figure	15.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Race	(Clustered),	with	Party	Effects	(Table)	
	 Democrats	
x2	=	.442;	p	=	.506	
Republicans	
x2	=	.434;	p	=	.510	
Non-Whites	 48%	(12/25)	 56%	(10/18)	
Whites	 40%	(27/67)	 64%	(53/83)	
This was another crossover interaction, where the main effect of the race variable was 
neutralized by opposing party effects.118	
Figure	16.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Race	(Clustered),	with	Party	Effects	(Bar	Graph)	
 
																																								 																				
118 “Main effect” (or “simple effect”) refers to the effect that the independent variable (i.e., race) has on the 
dependent variable (i.e., snap removal). “Interactions” refer to the combined effect of two independent variables 
(i.e., race and party) on the dependent variable (i.e., snap removal). 
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This moderating effect on both parties suggests that, with time, the increasing diversification 
of the federal judiciary will (or would, as the case may be119) decrease the level of polarization 
among Republicans and Democrats. However, what we observed did not register as statistically 
significant. Because there was no strong evidence that the race of the judge influenced outcomes, 
we do not further discuss this variable. 
 
4. Judicial Experience 
 
We tested several hypotheses regarding correlations between judicial experience and case 
outcomes. Our dataset allowed us to interrogate experience from different angles, including age, 
years of experience as a federal judge, senior/active status, and prior experience as a state judge.  
 
a. Age 
 
We first considered the age of the judge at the time the opinion was issued. Age is a tricky 
variable for a couple of reasons. First, as a linear variable the data gets sliced too thinly for a 
meaningful logistic regression: our population of 193 cases was spread across a range of 55 years 
(from age 39 to 94).120 That problem was easily solved by treating age as a categorical variable 
and clustering the population into age groups. But there was a second and more fundamental 
limitation about using age as a variable. Lest one be p-hacking, use of the age variable needed to 
be constrained to plausible explanatory hypotheses.121 
 
There were two plausible hypotheses with respect to a judge’s age and case outcomes. The 
first hypothesis, floated most recently by Gluck and Posner, was that young judges were more 
likely to reach textualist outcomes than their middle-aged and elder peers.122 A second 
																																								 																				
119 The gender diversity of President Trump’s appointees to the district court bench are slightly higher than the 
percentage of female judges in our dataset, but considerably lower than the gender diversity of President Obama’s 
judges. The racial diversity of President Trump’s appointees to the district court bench are substantially lower than 
the percentage of non-white judges in our dataset, and substantially lower than the percentage of non-white judges 
appointed by President Obama. See TAN ___, infra [figures 40.1, 40.2, 40.3, 40.4]. See also American Constitution 
Society, Diversity of the Federal Bench, available at https://www.acslaw.org/judicial-nominations/diversity-of-the-
federal-bench/ (last visited May 15, 2020) (reporting gender and racial diversity of President Obama’s appointees as 
42% and 36%, respectively). See also John Gramlich, How Trump Compares with Other Recent Presidents in 
Appointing Federal Judges, PEW RESEARCH CENTER FACTTANK (July 15, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2020/07/15/how-trump-compares-with-other-recent-presidents-in-appointing-federal-judges/.  See generally 
Carl Tobias, President Donald Trump’s War on Federal Judicial Diversity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 2019; Stacy 
Hawkins, Trump’s Dangerous Judicial Legacy, 67 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 20 (2019). 
120 The rule of thumb for logistic regression is a minimum of ten cases with the least frequent outcome for each 
independent variable in the model. 
Further, a linear experience variable (like a linear age variable) has a long tail that makes correlations with a 
categorical dependent variable like removal unlikely. Confidence or wisdom (or for whatever age is serving as the 
proxy here) likely does not intensify in a linear fashion: the effect of moving from year 2 to 3 is not the same as 
from 14 to 15 or from 26 to 27. 
121 Researchers should not use the data to create the hypotheses, because the data inevitably produce correlations that 
are pure chance. As explored more fully in Part III.C, supra, there is a danger in creating a model that is, in fact, a 
prediction of the past. The danger is crafting a theory that is so tied to idiosyncrasies in past data that it would not be 
validated by more (say, incoming future) data of the same sort. 
122 Gluck & Posner, supra, 131 HARV. L. REV. at 1311-12; see also id. at 1300, 1302, 1305, 1319, 1326, 1331, 1342, 
1351 & 1353. 
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hypothesis presumably would examine old judges. But what is the explanatory theory behind 
that? Perhaps being more or less textualist is correlated with advanced age (and emerging 
senility) because of a lack of rigor or pronounced stubbornness or an outsourcing of work to law 
clerks. We were dubious of such theories and we discuss them further below. The immediate 
point of emphasis with respect to p-hacking, however, is not the young nor the old, but rather the 
middle aged: there was no theoretical basis for exploring a difference in removal rates between, 
say, 61- and 68-year-old judges.123 
 
But a theory about eager young judges was plausible. Gluck and Posner described the 
influence of the emergence of an intellectually vibrant field of statutory interpretation (that 
featured textualism) beginning in the 1980s.124 That movement ultimately found its way into 
legal education where it displaced legal process theory.125 This, in turn, has caused a generational 
shift such that contemporary younger judges “do not seem to focus on the big picture questions 
about the judicial role and inherent authority that we heard emphasized by the older judges—
indeed, they seem more insecure than the older judges that they even have … authority [to fill 
gaps in laws, to correct Congress’s mistakes, or to make law.]”126 
 
We investigated—and to some extent confirmed—Gluck and Posner’s hypothesis about the 
young judge.127 We established a dummy variable, Young, that separated the young from the not 
young. Of course there is something arbitrary about choosing any particular age for a 
characteristic of young judge, but we chose 55.128 The average age-at-appointment for judges in 
our dataset was 50.129 About one-fifth of the judges in our dataset fell into this young judge 
category. To be clear, however, our Young variable was dynamic and, thus, included a judge 
																																								 																				
123 The data might suggest, for example, that judges who are in the first three years of their 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s 
might have higher removal rates than judges who are in the last three years of their 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s. Or even 
that such a pattern holds for the first three of those decades but then reverses for judges in their 80s. All this is easy 
to incorporate into a model to improve its predictive capacity. But absent some meaningful explanation, it is noisy 
nonsense. 
For the hopelessly curious, we share the following data: 
Figure	16.1.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Age	(Clustered),	with	Party	Effects	(Table)	
	 Democrats	 Combined	 Republicans	
≤	50	 50%	(2/4)	 69%	 78%	(7/9)	
51-59	 45%	(13/29)	 57%	 80%	(12/15)	
60-69	 38%	(14/37)	 46%	 52%	(25/48)	
≥	70	 45%	(10/22)	 56%	 66%	(19/29)	
The two takeaways here were (1) the relative stability of the Democrat removal rate across age groups, compared to 
Republicans; and (2) the loping U-shape of the removal rate across age groups. 
124 Gluck & Posner, supra, 131 HARV. L. REV. at 1304 (citing Frickey, supra, 77 MINN. L. REV. at 242 (practitioners 
in the 1970s had no scholarship to draw upon); John F. Manning, Legal Realism & The Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN 
BAG 2D 283, 290 (2002); Eskridge, supra, 113 COLUM. L. REV. at 532-33 (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra). 
125 Gluck & Posner, supra, 131 HARV. L. REV. at 1312 (citing sources). 
126 Gluck & Posner, supra, 131 HARV. L. REV. at 1311. 
127 Gluck and Posner’s survey was limited to appellate judges.  
128 Using the age of 60 as the cut-off delivered substantially similar results. 
129 The mean and the median were both 50. The mode was 48. 
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who was young at the time they issued their decision in, say, 1992.130 Even with that important 
qualification, almost all of our Young judges were in fact on the young side of the generational 
shift. Among the cases in our dataset decided by Young judges, 34 of 39 were decided in 2006 or 
later.131 The typical Young judge in our dataset was born in 1964 and graduated from law school 
in 1990.132 All 39 of the Young judges in our dataset assumed the bench well after Justice Scalia 
was already on the Supreme Court.133  
 
Figure 17, below, contrasts the removal rates for young and over-55 judges. The distinction 
was very nearly statistically significant at the .10 level. 
Figure	17.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Age	(Clustered)	
x2	=	2.484;	p	=	.115	
Young	 64%	(25/39)	
Over	55	 50%	(77/154)	
Once again we subgrouped the data for a deeper understanding of this variable and its 
possible interaction with the party variable. That data is presented in figure 18. 
Figure	18.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Age	(Clustered),	with	Party	Effects	(Table)	
	 Democrats	
x2	=	1.844;	p	=	.175	
Republicans	
x2	=	2.332;	p	=	.127	
Young	 54%	(13/24)	 80%	(12/15)	
Over	55	 38%	(26/68)	 59%	(51/86)	
We did not observe much of a party effect: among both Democrats and Republicans, their young 
judges had higher removal rates. The odds of removal by a young Democrat judge were 1.91 
times that of the non-young Democrat. The odds of removal by a young Republican judge were 
2.75 times that of the non-young Republican. The p score for each of these sub-groups was less 
impressive than the p score for the combined group (as captured in figure 17); this is attributable 
to the smaller population size of the subgroups. Figure 19, below, offers a graphic illustration of 
the same data. 
																																								 																				
130 For example, in Wensil v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 792 F. Supp. 447 (D.S.C. 1992), a 39-year-old then-
District Judge Dennis Shedd allowed snap removal. Judge Shedd graduated from law school in 1978. In 2020, now-
Circuit Judge Shedd is 67 years old.  
131 The five exceptions were decided in 1991, 1992, 1998, 2002, and 2003, respectively. 
132 Only two were born before 1951—in 1946 and 1949, respectively. 
133 The earliest appointment to the federal bench among this group of young judges occurred in 1990. See generally 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (describing how Justice Scalia inspired 
a “new” textualism); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1597 (1991) (discussing Justice Scalia’s singular role). See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION (1997). 
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Figure	19.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Age	(Clustered),	with	Party	Effects	(Bar	Graph)		
 
The party effect was modest, so the more compelling finding was the higher removal rate as a 
main effect of the Young variable. 
 
We also interrogated the second hypothesis regarding an “old judge” effect. We struggled 
with the definition of who was old, and more fundamentally, we lacked conviction in possible 
hypotheses that explored something beyond the “not young” judge, which we have already (if 
indirectly) addressed above. In any event, we settled upon something with a theoretical 
grounding, but reserve discussion of that effect until Part III.B.4.c, infra. 
 
b. Article III Experience 
 
We calculated the number of years of experience as an Article III judge that each judge had 
accrued when their opinion was issued. We observed less effect on this alternative measure of 
experience than we observed on our examination of age in Part III.B.4.a, supra. 
 
We followed the same methodological approaches that we used for the age variable by 
converting experience into categorical data, and avoiding reliance on atheoretial correlations.134 
Using three or fewer years of experience as the definition of a new judge, we found essentially 
no difference in removal rates between the two cohorts. 
																																								 																				
134 The atheoretical forays were not especially productive in any event. But lest we disappoint the data-dredging 
enthusiast, we share the following data: 
Figure	19.5.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by	
Years	of	Experience	(Clustered),	with	Party	Effects	(Table)	
	 Democrats	 Combined	 Republicans	
0	-3	 45%	(9/20)	 54%	 75%	(6/8)	
4	–	10	 39%	(12/31)	 44%	 50%	(13/26)	
11	–	20	 50%	(11/22)	 71%	 83%	(25/29)	
>	20	 37%	(7/19)	 47%	 53%	(20/38)	
The two takeaways here are (1) the relative stability of the Democratic removal rate across experience clusters, 
compared to Republicans; and (2) the matched patterns (of fall, rise, and fall) of the removal rates with increased 
experience among Democrats and Republicans. 
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Figure	20.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Art.	III	Experience	(Clustered)	
x2	=	.007;	p	=	.934	
0-3	Years	 54%	(15/28)	
More	than	3	 53%	(87/165)	
This suggests that Gluck and Posner were correct in suggesting that textualism was a “young 
judge” phenomenon, as opposed to a “new judge” phenomenon.135 Indeed even when we used 
four years (instead of three) as the definition of a “new judge,” we reached similar results (with 
52% and 53% removal rates, respectively).136 That is to say that the “young judge” and “new 
judge” cohorts were not coextensive. 
 
As we observed with the “young judge” cohort, the “new judge” cohort is more heavily 
populated with Democrats. The interaction of the “new judge” and party effect variables is 
demonstrated in Figure 21 below. 
Figure	21.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Art.	III	Experience	(Clustered),	with	Party	Effects	(Table)	
	 Democrats	
x2	=	.071;	p	=	.790	
Republicans	
x2	=	.059;	p	=	.442	
0-3	Years	 45%	(9/20)	 75%	(6/8)	
More	than	3	 42%	(30/72)	 61%	(57/93)	
With these subgroups, there was modest evidence that being a new judge was more predictive of 
removal for Republicans than Democrats. Yet it was not statistically significant—especially with 
such a small sample size. Figure 22 illustrates the magnitude of the effect graphically.  
Figure	22.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Art.	III	Experience	(Clustered),	with	Party	Effects	(Bar	Graph)	
 
																																								 																				
135 We do not mean to suggest that Gluck and Posner rejected the “new judge” label in favor of their “young judge” 
label. They are silent on this point. 
136 17 / 33 = 52%, and 85/160 = 53%, respectively. This calculation with the 4-year cutoff had an n of 33, compared 
to the n of 39 for the “young judge” calculation.  
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For both Democrats and Republicans the spread between “new judge” and more-experienced 
judge was substantially smaller than it was on the measure of age, which is reflected in figures 
18 and 19, above. 
 
At the other end of the experience continuum, of course, are judges with extensive 
experience. We discuss them in the next subpart. 
 
c. Senior Status 
 
We have previously alluded to hypotheses about the removal rate of elder or especially-
experienced judges. Thrashing for a defensible variable to explore, we settled upon Senior Judge 
status. To qualify for senior status a judge must satisfy two conditions: (i) be at least 65 years of 
age and (ii) have a sum of age plus years of federal court service that is at least 80.137 Senior 
status is voluntary, and election of this status does not necessarily mean anything with respect to 
the judge’s caseload, commitment, or capacity. But a senior judge does not participate in en banc 
panels, suggesting some nominal detachment. And many senior judges do transition to lighter 
caseloads. Though undoubtedly both underinclusive and overinclusive of elder statesmanship, 
electing senior status is an objective indication of advanced age and experience. Query then 
whether it was also indicative of an intensified fondness for—or resistance to—the formalism 
represented in textualist outcomes. 
 
More than a quarter of the cases in our dataset were decided by Senior Judges.138 The 
average age of a Senior Judge in our dataset (measured at the time of the decision) was 75.2 
years, and with 24.8 years of experience.139 As demonstrated in figure 23, their rates of removal 
were similar to their active peers. 
Figure	23.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Senior	and	Active	Judges	
x2	=	.107;	p	=	.744	
Senior		 51%	(27/53)	
Active	 54%	(75/140)	
The interaction of the “senior judge” and party variables demonstrated in Figure 24 was more 
interesting, however. 
																																								 																				
137 28 U.S.C. § 371(c). 
138 This datum is no surprise to those who have documented the incredible workload borne by the judiciary’s Senior 
Judges. See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Leaving the Bench, 1970-2009: The Choices Federal Judges Make, What 
Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 93 (2012) (observing that, in 2009, senior 
district judges accounted for 21.2 percent of case terminations and 26.8 percent of all trials).  
139	The medians for these measures were 74 and 23, respectively. 
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Figure	24.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Senior	and	Active	Judges,	with	Party	Effects	(Table)	
	 Democrats	
x2	=	.685;	p	=	.408	
Republicans	
x2	=	2.208;	p	=	.137	
Senior	 50%	(11/22)	 51%	(16/31)	
Active	 40%	(28/70)	 67%	(47/70)	
Here we observed senior status playing a role similar to that which we observed in the 
context of race. Senior status had a crossover interaction with the parties that had a moderating 
influence on both subgroups: raising the rate of removal by Democrats and lowering the rate of 
removal by Republicans. The effect within the Republican subgroup was nearly statistically 
significant at .10. Figure 25 graphically illustrates the crossover interaction. The removal rate 
among senior judges was essentially 50% regardless of party. 
Figure	25.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Senior	and	Active	Judges,	with	Party	Effects	(Bar	Graph)	
 
The moderating influence of senior judges (on their more polarized, active peers) was an 
attractive narrative, to be sure. And the near-statistical significance of the Republican subgroup 
justified a hunt. But we ultimately abandoned the chase when we could not corroborate these 
findings with enough data to allay our concerns with using it. The strongest argument in favor of 
using it was that senior status is something of a compromise variable between two other 
purported measures of advanced age and experience. Figure 26, below, lays out the three 
measures with the ordinal headings for each of them.  
Figure	26.	Effect	of	Different	Variables	for	Age	and	Experience	
on	Snap	Removal	Rates,	with	Party	Effects	(Table)	
	 Democrats	 Combined	 Republicans	
Senior	Status	 Increases	 No	effect	 Decreases	
75+	Years	Old	 Increases	 Increases	 Increases	
20+	Years	Experience	 Decreases	 Decreases	 Decreases	
The middle row suggests that old judges had higher rates of removal than their younger 
colleagues. The bottom row suggests that highly experienced judges had lower rates of removal 
than their less experienced colleagues. And of course the first row suggests that senior judges 
had the same rates of removal as their (generally younger, generally less experienced) active 
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colleagues—and had a mollifying effect on the removal rates of their fellow Democrats and 
Republicans. Statistical noise is the most conservative explanation of these disparate results. 
Drawing conclusions about this data would likely be as dubious as the explanatory theory that 
would need to accompany it. 
 
d. State Court Experience 
 
Approximately one-third of the cases in our dataset were authored by judges who served as 
state court judges before their appointment to the federal bench. We speculated that that 
exposure or affinity might lead a judge to be more inclined to remand a snap-removed case, since 
the judge would know first-hand that it was an unbiased forum with competent judges. 
Accordingly, we investigated whether prior service as a state court judge helped predict 
outcomes. We measured this as a binary categorical variable, rather than as a linear variable that 
segmented state court experience by years of service.140 
As demonstrated in figure 27, below, service as a state court judge was another statistically-
uninteresting variable.  
Figure	27.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Whether	Any	State	Court	Judicial	Experience	
x2	=	.312;	p	=	.576	
Experience	 50%	(32/64)	
No	Experience	 54%	(70/129)	
Looking again for distinctive interactions with party, the removal rates for each of these 
subgroups appear in figure 28, below. 
Figure	28.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by	Whether	
Any	State	Court	Judicial	Experience,	with	Party	Effects	
	 Democrats	
x2	=	.260;	p	=	.610	
Republicans	
x2	=	.065;	p	=	.798	
Experience	 39%	(12/31)	 60%	(20/33)	
No	Experience	 44%	(27/61)	 63%	(43/68)	
The effect of this variable was uniform but negligible across both subgroups. Accordingly, we 
concluded that there was no evidence that prior state court judicial service influenced a judge’s 
decision to allow snap removal, and we do not further discuss this variable.  We found this 
surprising in that we had initially posited that a federal judge with state court service would be 
more deferential to state court proceedings and more likely to remand snap removed cases.  
Apparently not. 
 
5. Education 
 
In this section we present our most surprising—and probably the most important—finding of 
our study. The party effect which was observed in the parsing of so many variables discussed 
above was, in fact, driven almost entirely by judges with elite educations. In other words, judges 
																																								 																				
140 See TAN ___, supra [discussion of age variable, where you have to categorize/cluster or else the sample sizes are 
too small]. 
39	
	
who did not attend elite institutions had essentially the same removal rates, regardless of whether 
they were Republican or Democratic appointees. That is, party effect is a feature of elite-
educated Republican judges who pushed removal rates up, and of elite-educated Democratic 
judges who pulled removal rates down.  
 
a. Undergraduate 
 
We investigated and coded the undergraduate education of each of the judges who authored 
opinions in our dataset. We then grouped the colleges and universities into three categories of 
eliteness.141 We were curious whether the eliteness of the judge’s undergraduate education had 
any predictive value in determining that judge’s treatment of snap removal.  
 
As indicated in figure 29 below, there was no observable effect in the eliteness of 
undergraduate education variable. 
Figure	29.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Eliteness	of	Undergraduate	Education	(Clustered)		
x2	=	.299;	p	=	.861	
Top	4	 48%	(14/29)	
Top	20	 54%	(25/46)	
Others	 53%	(63/118)	
However, we observed that this undergraduate education variable was being distorted by its 
interaction with party. Specifically, the eliteness of a judge’s undergraduate education had an 
observable negative correlation with snap removal for Democrats, but a positive correlation for 
Republicans. This is depicted in figure 30, below. 
Figure	30.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by		
Eliteness	of	Undergraduate	Education	(Clustered),		
with	Party	Effects	(Table)	
	 Democrats	
x2	=	1.842;	p	=	.241	
Republicans	
x2	=	4.231;	p	=	.121	
Top	4	 33%	(5/15)	 64%	(9/14)	
Top	20	 32%	(8/25)	 81%	(17/21)	
Others	 50%	(26/52)	 56%	(37/66)	
This was another crossover interaction where the opposing forces of the party variable had a 
cancellation effect with respect to the main variable. Put another way, there was evidence that 
eliteness matters, but it mattered differently—indeed, oppositionally—for the party subgroups. 
A point worth emphasizing is the relatively modest difference between the removal rates of 
Republicans and Democrats who attended non-elite undergraduate institutions. Among that 
cohort, there was only a modest difference in removal rates: 50% for Democrats and 56% for 
																																								 																				
141 The “Top 4” includes Yale, Harvard, Stanford and Princeton Universities. The “Top 20” includes the other top 20 
National Universities and also the top 20 Liberal Arts Colleges, according to U.S. News & World Report’s 2020 
College Rankings. See https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges (last visited May 1, 2020). Our model thus assumes a 
certain linearity between the two steps of this hierarchy.  
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Republicans. But the difference in the respective parties’ removal rates spread as each attended 
more elite institutions. This fact is illustrated well by the line graph in figure 31, below. 
Figure	31.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by	Eliteness	of	
Undergraduate	Education	(Clustered),	
with	Party	Effects	(Line	Graph)	
	
As reported in figure 30, the effect of eliteness of undergraduate education on removal was more 
pronounced for Republican judges; it was nearly statistically significant at the .10 level. 
 
b. Law School 
 
We also explored the legal education of each of the judges who authored opinions in our 
dataset. We then grouped the law schools into four categories of eliteness.142 We were curious 
whether the eliteness of the judge’s legal education had any predictive value in determining that 
judge’s treatment of snap removal.  
 
As indicated in figure 32 below, there was an observable effect with removal rates declining 
with the increase in eliteness. Yet a main effect was not, by itself, statistically significant. 
Figure	32.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Eliteness	of	Legal	Education	(Clustered)		
x2	=	3.873;	p	=	.276	
Top	3	 41%	(12/29)	
Top	14	 47%	(20/43)	
Top	50	 54%	(26/48)	
Others	 61%	(44/73)	
We investigated and discovered yet another interaction with party effect. The eliteness of a 
judge’s education had a strong negative correlation with snap removal for Democrats, and a 
slight positive correlation for Republicans. This was another crossover interaction, as depicted in 
figure 33, below. 
																																								 																				
142 The “Top 3” includes Yale, Harvard, and Stanford. The “Top 14” and “Top 50” schools were ranked according to 
U.S. News & World Report’s 2020 Law School Rankings. See https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges (last visited 
May 1, 2020). Our model thus assumes a certain linearity among the three steps of this hierarchy. 
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Figure	33.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by		
Eliteness	of	Legal	Education	(Clustered),		
with	Party	Effects	(Table)	
	 Democrats	
x2	=	8.528;	p	=	.036**	
Republicans	
x2	=	.497;	p	=	.919	
Top	3	 24%	(4/17)	 67%	(8/12)	
Top	14	 30%	(7/23)	 65%	(13/20)	
Top	50	 44%	(11/25)	 65%	(15/23)	
Others	 63%	(17/27)	 59%	(27/46)	
The variable was statistically significant for the subgroup of Democrat judges at an impressive 
.05 level. 
 
A line graph can effectively convey a crossover interaction, and figure 34, below, does not 
disappoint.  
Figure	34.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by	Eliteness	of	
Legal	Education	(Clustered),	
with	Party	Effects	(Line	Graph)	
 
Figure 34 casts critically important light on nearly every finding in this paper. The party effects 
which we have discussed ad nauseum were, in fact, localized to judges (Republicans and 
Democrats) who attended elite institutions. Figure 34 demonstrates that the removal rates for 
Republican and Democrat judges who attended non-elite institutions were nearly the same—
actually, the rate of removal was slightly higher among Democrats in that cohort. 
 
The two eliteness-of-education variables sound similar notes. With both undergraduate 
education and legal education, eliteness increased the removal rate for Republicans and 
decreased it for Democrats. The undergraduate education variable was more statistically 
indicative for Republicans than Democrats, and the legal education variable was statistically 
significant for Democrats. 
 
6. Subject Matter of Case 
 
We also considered the theory that the characteristics of the case, rather than merely the 
judge, could be predictive of textualist outcomes. To be clear, the answer to the naked legal 
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Others Top 50 Top 14 Top 3
Rep. Dem.
42	
	
question presented by the forum defendant rule is not formally shaped by the subject matter of 
the case. Yet we coded whether each case involved matters of tort or contract. We speculated 
that judges might systematically be more sympathetic to snap removal in cases where defendants 
were exposed to tort liability. The data confirmed that suspicion. 
 
As an initial matter, we noticed that the issue of snap removal arose in a disproportionate 
number of torts cases. Well over eighty percent of the cases in our dataset were torts cases, with 
contracts cases accounting for the remaining 16.6 percent.143 As a reference point, the percentage 
of torts cases among federal diversity cases generally for that same time period was consistently 
below sixty percent (60%) until the year 2003, below seventy percent (70%) until 2008, and has 
never reached the eighty percent (80%) plateau.144 So, assuming our dataset is representative, 
defendants in torts cases were disproportionately more likely than defendants in contract cases to 
attempt a snap removal. This observation made our next finding all the more compelling. 
 
Judges also allowed snap removal in a disproportionate number of torts cases. The numbers 
are reported in figure 35, below. 
Figure	35.	Snap	Removal	Rate		
by	Case	Subject-Matter	
x2	=	2.301;	p	=	.129	
Contracts	 40%	(13/32)	
Torts	 55%	(89/161)	
Even with this relatively small number of contracts cases, the correlation was nearly statistically 
significant at the .10 level. An odds ratio is also illustrative: the odds that a judge would remove 
a torts case were 1.81 times greater than the odds that a contract case would be removed.145 
Of course we also tested for interactions with party effects. Both Democratic and Republican 
judges were more likely to remove torts cases. Data for the subgroups are presented in figure 36. 
Figure	36.	Snap	Removal	Rate	
by	Case	Subject-Matter,	with	Party	Effects	
	 Democrats	
x2	=	.430;	p	=	.512	
Republicans	
x2	=	1.853;	p	=	.173	
Contracts	 35%	(6/17)	 47%	(7/15)	
Torts	 44%	(33/75)	 65%	(56/86)	
The subject-matter effect was more pronounced among Republicans, but the p value was 
stronger in the combined data (in Figure 35) than it was for either of the subgroups. This was 
attributable to the parsing of the already-small population of contracts cases. The combined data 
in the main effect, then, was the stronger statistical measure. 
																																								 																				
143 Our categorization of torts cases includes a very small number of civil rights and discrimination suits. Our 
categorization of contracts cases includes a small number of breach of fiduciary duty suits, wrongful foreclosures, 
some employment matters (non-competes), and labor suits.  
144 See United States Courts, U.S. District Courts—Civil Judicial Facts and Figures tbl 4.9 (Sept. 30, 2019), 
available at https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/49/judicial-facts-and-figures/2019/09/30 (last visited May 1, 
2020). 
145 The odds for removal of a contract case are 13 / 19 = .684. The odds for removal of a torts case are 89 / 72 = 
1.236.  The ratio of these odds is 1.236 / .684 = 1.807. 
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7. Efficiency Considerations 
 
Finally, we contemplated that a judge’s allowance of snap removal could be motivated in 
part by enthusiasm for consolidation of related cases in federal court. A case is not eligible for 
multidistrict litigation (MDL) consolidation, for example, unless it is properly in federal court.146 
We hypothesized that the lure of efficiency and uniformity that is (correctly or incorrectly) 
associated with consolidation could influence the decision whether to allow snap removal.  
 
With binary coding, we generously included within the category of MDL cases, all opinions 
that involved then- former, current, or prospective MDL matters.147 With this classification 
protocol, 59 (or 31%) of the opinions in the dataset were MDL cases. As a reference point, in 
recent years, MDL cases have constituted approximately 30% of the total civil caseload of the 
federal courts.148 
 
An overwhelming majority—although not all—MDL consolidations involve torts, not 
contracts.149 The prospect of collinearity between this MDL variable and the tort (subject-matter) 
variable deserved careful attention: if the MDL variable was highly predictive of removal, then 
the prospect of MDL consolidation could have been exaggerating the effect of the tort variable 
discussed in Part III.B.6 above.  
 
But the MDL variable was not strongly correlated with the allowance of snap removal. In 
fact, as reported in figure 37, below, an MDL case was less likely to be removed than a non-
MDL case. 
Figure	37.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by	
Whether	Subject	to	Consolidation	
x2	=	.137;	p	=	.712	
MDL	 51%	(30/59)	
Non-MDL	 54%	(72/134)	
Finding nothing statistically significant in MDL consolidation as a main variable, we turned 
our attention to interactions with our variables. Again we observed a crossover interaction with 
																																								 																				
146 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
147 Indeed, any inter-district consolidation of matters was treated as an “MDL” case for our purposes. The 
availability of snap removal plays the same role with respect to the (real or perceived) gains of efficiency and 
uniformity through consolidated treatment of related matters.  
148 See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION—CASES TRANSFERRED BY ORDER OF JUDICIAL PANEL 
ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, tbl. S-19 (Sept. 30, 2019), available at https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/s-
19/judicial-business/2019/09/30 (reporting 134,462 as the total number of pending consolidated cases); U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL JUDICIAL BUSINESS, tbl C (Sept. 30, 2019), available at 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c/judicial-business/2019/09/30 (reporting 357,566 as the total number of 
pending cases). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Reflections of a Recovering Aggregationist, 15 NEV. L.J. 1455 
(2015); Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. 
REV. 511 (2013); Judith Resnik, From Cases to Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991); Thomas 
Metzloff, The MDL Vortex Revisited, 99 JUDICATURE 36 (2015). 
149	See United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Calendar Year Statistics January Through December 
2019, available at https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics-2019_1.pdf (last 
visited June 23, 2020) (reporting contract cases as constituting 2.1% of current caseload).	
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the party variable: the prospect of consolidation made Democrats a little more likely to remove 
and Republicans a little less likely to remove. This data is presented in figure 38, below. 
Figure	38.	Snap	Removal	Rate	by		
Whether	Subject	to	Consolidation,	with	Party	Effects	(Table) 
	 Democrats	
x2	=	.147;	p	=	.702	
Republicans	
x2	=	.452;	p	=	.501	
MDL	 45%	(14/31)	 57%	(16/28)	
Non-MDL	 41%	(25/61)	 64%	(47/73)	
 
Relative to their respective baselines, Democratic judges appear to have had the more 
sympathetic response to the instrumental arguments for snap removal. But even when divided 
into subgroups, these data did not approach statistical significance. Accordingly, we concluded 
that there was no evidence that the prospect of MDL consolidation influences a judge’s decision 
to allow snap removal, and we do not further discuss this variable. 
 
C. Logistic Regression Model 
 
Our logit model is expressed in only four variables. The model reflects our balancing of the 
competing goals of formal parsimony, theoretical grounding, and predictive accuracy.150 We 
make no pretense about the level of precision in this mode of inquiry. We are not under the 
illusion that judicial decision-making is a product of certain independent variables that combine 
to produce a dependent variable. But we are interested in general trends, defensible associations, 
and demonstrable correlations.  
 
As an initial matter it is important to appreciate that regression models predict the past rather 
than the future. Accordingly, only creativity and dubious ethics are necessary to produce a model 
with 100% accuracy.  Cynics have described linear regression as “torturing” the data until it 
“confesses.”  The constraining principle on sound model design is to create a model that is also 
plausibly predictive of the future. Paradoxically, overfitting the model to predict the past 
compromises the model’s capacity to predict the future, and vice versa. We preferred a forward-
focused model, and we look forward to validating it with data in upcoming years. In the 
meantime, the ability to offer a theoretical explanation for each variable is a meaningful 
substitute.  
 
Three of the four variables in our integrated model are main-effect variables that were 
strongly correlated with removal: Female, Young, and Tort.151 The fourth is the interaction 
variable that included Democrat judges and the eliteness of their legal education.152 A logistic 
regression of these variables produced the results in figure 39, below. 
																																								 																				
150	See generally DAVID W. HOSMER ET AL., APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 89 (2013) (“Successful modeling of a 
complex data set is part science, part statistical methods, and part experience and common sense.”). 
151	As a reminder the p values for female, young, and tort were respectively: .212, .115, and .129. See TAN __, ___, 
and ___, supra. For a discussion of the importance of using higher significance levels as a screening criterion for 
initial variable selection, see Ruth M. Mickey & Sander Greenland, A Study of the Impact of Confounder-Selection 
Criteria on Effect Estimation, 129 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOL. 125 (1989) (showing that the use of a more demanding 
level of significance has distortion effects). 
152 The p-value for this variable was .036**.	
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Figure	39	Logistic	Regression	of	Removal,	Results	
LR	chi2(4)	=	26.04;	Prob	>	chi2	=	.000*** 
	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 P>|z|	
Female	 .711	 .385	 .064*	
Young	(≤55)	 .965	 .420	 .022**	
Tort	 .641	 .433	 .139	
Elite	LS	+	Democrat	 -	.498	 .122	 .000***	
_cons	 -.228	 .442	 .606	
Variables with positive coefficients are correlated with removal, and variables with negative 
coefficients are correlated with remand. The magnitude of each coefficient indicates its relative 
prominence in the model’s predictions. 
The coefficients in the table in Figure 39 can be used to make predictions about whether a 
case is likely to be removed.153 Every prediction begins with the coefficient of the constant 
(_cons), which is -.228. When predicting the outcome of a case, add the coefficients for any and 
all of the variables that are triggered by that scenario. In other words, if the judge is female, add 
.711 to the constant. Or (And) if the judge is young, add (another) .965. Or (And) if the case is a 
tort, add (another) .641. (The interaction variable requires something slightly different, and we 
will discuss that shortly.) The coefficients are the log odds of removal. Log odds are not an 
intuitively meaningful number.154 But log odds are the logarithm of the (more intuitive) odds, 
and one can convert log odds into odds by raising the exponential constant to the power of those 
odds, using ex. And further still, if one prefers probabilities to odds, that requires only one more 
step: dividing odds by (1 + odds).155 
 
It may seem that a variable for Republican judges is conspicuously absent from the list of 
variables since this paper has made clear that, as a first approximation, Republican judges are the 
removers. But notice what happens with respect to predictions in cases involving Republican 
judges in each of the following scenarios that trigger (only) one of the listed variables: 
 
(1) The Republican judge is a woman:  
-.228 + .711 = .483.  e.483 = odds = 1.621. (Probability of removal = 62%) 
 
(2) The Republican judge is young: 
-.228 + .965 = .737.  e.737 = odds = 2.090. (Probability of removal = 68%) 
 
(3) The Republican judge is hearing a tort case: 
-.228 + .641 = .413.  e.413 = odds = 1.511. (Probability of removal = 60%) 
																																								 																				
153	The estimated coefficients for the independent variables represent the slope (i.e., rate of change) of a function of 
the dependent variable per unit of change in the independent variable.	
154	Readers familiar only with linear regression must appreciate that if we try to predict the probabilities of a 
categorical variable like removal we have a problem of non-linearity, specifically the floor at 0 and the ceiling of 1 
inherent in probabilities. But when the explanatory variables predict the log odds we do not have this problem.	
155	The math conveys a certain precision that can be misleading. It can be useful to think of the coefficients not as 
the number reported, but rather as a range that hovers above and below that number. The size of that range is 
described by multiples of the standard error, which is also reported in the results in figure 39. The standard error 
reflects the fragility of the coefficient, with that fragility defined by characteristics of the dataset. Notice that the 
coefficient for the Tort variable, while positive, is only (.641 / .433 =) 1.5 standard errors away from drifting into 
negative numbers. By contrast, the Young variable is (.965 / .420 =) 2.3 standard errors away from zero. 	
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In all three of the above scenarios the odds of removal are greater than 1 (and the probability 
greater than 50%). The model thus predicts removal for all three. In fact, the model always 
predicts removal by a Republican judge unless the scenario presented triggers none of the three 
listed variables: 
 
(4) The Republican judge is a male, 65 years old, in a contract case: 
-.228.  e-.228 = odds = .796. (Probability of removal = 44%) 
 
Of course the odds and probabilities get much higher if the scenario triggers not just one, but two 
(or, hypothetically, all three) of the listed variables. Imagine, for example 
 
(5) The Republican is a woman, 63 years old, in a tort case: 
-.228 + .711 + .641 = 1.124.  e1.124 = odds = 3.077. (Probability of removal = 75%) 
 
Even without a separate Republican variable, the correlation of removal with Republican judges 
was captured in the reference category (i.e., the constant). All Democratic judges ineluctably 
vacate the reference category by invoking at least the interaction variable (and perhaps other 
listed variables as well). Accordingly, the reference category essentially incorporates the relevant 
correlation between Republicans and removals; adding a Republican variable would have been 
superfluous. 156 
 
The fourth variable in the table is different than the other variables in figure 39 in two 
respects. First, it is an interaction variable rather than a main effect variable. As discussed in Part 
III.B.5.b, the variable for eliteness of legal education was not statistically significant as a main-
effect variable because Republican and Democratic judges were pulling it in opposite directions. 
Incorporated here, then, is only the Democratic subgroup as identified in figure 33. Every 
Democratic judge always triggers this variable and no Republican judge ever triggers this 
variable.  
 
Second, this variable, unlike the other three variables in this model, is not binary. Rather, as 
depicted in figure 33, there are four levels of eliteness: outside the top 50, top 50, top 14, and top 
																																								 																				
156	To illustrate the point, adding a Republican variable to our model produces the following results.	
Figure	39.1	Logistic	Regression	of	Removal,	
Results	of	Alternative	Model	1	
LR	chi2(5)	=	26.50;	Prob	>	chi2	=	.000*** 
	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 P>|z|	
Female	 .705	 .387	 .068*	
Young	(≤55)	 .964	 .424	 .023**	
Tort	 .600	 .439	 .171	
Elite	LS	+	Democrat	 -	.624	 .225	 .006***	
Republican	 -	.393	 .583	 .500	
_cons	 .	148	 .711	 .835	
In this alternative model, the log odds of removal by a Republican who does not trigger any other variable is .148 + 
(- .393) = - .245. e-245 = .783. (Probability of removal = 44%). Hence it is the same result as in hypothetical (4) in the 
main text. This alternative model in figure 39.1 predicts the dataset with 64.3% accuracy, with true positive and true 
negative rates of 78% and 48%, respectively. 
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3. For variables like this that are not binary, we add multiples of the coefficient when doing the 
calculations allowed by the model. Thus for Democratic judges in the model, the coefficient of -
.498 is multiplied by 1, 2, 3, or 4, respectively, depending on the level of eliteness of the judge’s 
legal education. Consider these scenarios involving Democratic judges: 
  
(6) The Democratic judge is a woman, 63 years old, Yale Law School grad, in a tort case:  
-.228 + .711 +.641 + (4 * -.498) = -.868.  e-.868 = odds = .420. (Probability of removal = 30%) 
 
(7) The Democratic judge is a male, 51 years old, Marquette grad, in a tort case: 
-.228 + .965 +.641 + (1 * -.498) = .880.  e.880 = odds = 2.41. (Probability of removal = 71%) 
 
Throughout this article we have implied that, to a first approximation, Democratic judges 
remand. That inclination is reflected in this model too, but remember that Democratic judges 
who attended non-elite law schools had removal rates of 63%,157 which is also the removal rate 
for the typical Republican judge. This model’s predictions are highly sensitive to the eliteness of 
the Democratic judge’s legal education. For scenarios that trigger two of the main-effect 
variables (say, Tort and Young), the model predicts removal by a Democratic judge unless that 
judge has at least 3 (of the possible 4) levels of eliteness.158 For scenarios that trigger all three of 
the main-effect variables, the model predicts removal by a Democrat judge even with all 4 levels 
of eliteness. 159 
 
Figure 40, below, presents a classification table for this model. It is a scorecard of the 
model’s ability to predict the outcomes of all cases in the dataset—i.e., to predict the past. The 
model is accurate in 64.3% of the cases. 
Figure	40.	Classification	Table	
	 	 Observed	
Pr
ed
ic
te
d	 	 Removed	 Remanded	
Removed	 72	(71%)	 39	(43%)	
Remanded	 30	(29%)	 52	(57%)	
	 	 =	64.3%	
The upper-left quadrant and the lower-right quadrant represent the true positives and true 
negatives, respectively.160 The model is better at predicting removals than at predicting remands. 
The upper-right quadrant reports the false positives (“Type I errors”) and the lower-left quadrant 
the rate of false negatives (“Type II errors”). One might fairly criticize this model as erring on 
the side of predicting removals, rather than risk missing some. Erring on the side of over-
predicting removals was a deliberate decision. We wanted ballast in the model to make it more 
durable for future predictions. We have speculated that there will be more polarization and also 
more removals.161 We also expect the Young judge variable to become less potent as judges 
																																								 																				
157 See TAN ___, supra. 
158 The math for this scenario follows. -.228 + .965 + .641 + (3 * -.498) = -.116. e-.116 = odds = .890. Probability of 
removal: 47%. 
159 The math for this scenario follows. -.228 + .711 + .965 +.641 + (4 * -.498) = .097.  e.097 = odds = 1.102. 
Probability of removal: 52%. 
160 The true positive and true negative rates are often referred to as sensitivity and specificity measures, respectively. 
161	Our prediction of more removals is a function also of President Trump’s appointments to the district court bench. 
As of June 27, 2020, there were 143 district judges who had been approved by the Senate. Figure 40.1 suggests that 
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outgrow the age-restricted group, but do not outgrow their legal education and other factors that 
made that age group more inclined to remove relative to their elders. 
 
The classification table in figure 40 is not fine-grained to distinguish the accuracy of a 
prediction in light of its strength. In other words, predictions of removal are treated the same, 
whether the prediction was removal by a hair’s breadth or removal by a mile. But getting both of 
those predictions right (or wrong) is not the same achievement (or problem). Goodness-of-fit 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
there is more gender diversity in this pool of new appointees relative to the judges in the dataset. Because gender 
(female) is positively correlated with removal (especially among Republican women, see figure 12), this supports a 
prediction of more removals in the short term. 
Figure	40.1.	Gender	Diversity	Among	Judges	
	 	 Judges	in	Dataset	
	 Trump	Appointees	 Republicans		 All	
Female	 25.9%	(37)	 17.8%	(18)	 23.8%	(46)	
Male	 74.1%	(106)	 82.2%	(83)	 76.2%	(147)	
 
Figure 40.2 suggests that there is less racial diversity in the pool of new appointees relative to the judges in the 
dataset. Because race (non-white) was a disordinal variable that was negatively correlated with Republican removal 
rates and positive correlated with Democrat removal rates (see figure 15), the lack of diversity among new 
appointees supports a prediction of more removals in the short term. 
Figure	40.2.	Racial	Diversity	Among	Judges	
	 	 Judges	in	Dataset	
	 Trump	Appointees	 Republicans		 All	
Non-White	 12.6%	(18)	 17.8%	(18)	 22.3%	(43)	
White	 87.4%	(125)	 82.2%	(83)	 77.7%	(150)	
 
Figure 40.3 suggests that the pool of new appointees attended substantially less elite undergraduate institutions 
relative to the judges in the dataset. Because Republican judges who attended non-elite undergraduate institutions 
had substantially lower removal rates than Republican judges who attended more elite institutions (see figure 30), 
this datum does not support a prediction of more removals in the short term. 
Figure	40.3.	Eliteness	of	Undergraduate	Education	Among	Judges	
	 	 Judges	in	Dataset	
	 Trump	Appointees	 Republicans		 All	
Top	4	 2.0%	(3)	 13.9%	(14)	 15.0%	(29)	
Top	20	 18.2%	(26)	 20.8%	(21)	 23.8%	(46)	
Others	 79.8%	(114)	 65.3%	(66)	 61.1%	(118)	
 
Figure 40.4 suggests that the pool of new appointees attended law schools in proportions that approximate the 
proportions of judges in the dataset. This datum would suggest that the removal rate should be relatively stable. (See 
Figure 33.) 
Figure	40.4.	Eliteness	of	Legal	Education	Among	Judges	
	 	 Judges	in	Dataset	
	 Trump	Appointees	 Republicans		 All	
Top	3	 11.2%	(16)	 11.9%	(12)	 15.0%	(29)	
Top	14	 13.3%	(19)	 19.8%	(20)	 22.3%	(43)	
Top	50	 34.3%	(49)	 22.8%	(23)	 24.9%	(48)	
Others	 41.3%	(59)	 45.5%	(46)	 37.8%	(73)	
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tests, broadly speaking, assess whether the model’s strongest predictions prove correct and the 
model’s errors are clustered within the predicted close-calls.162 These tests produce a p value to 
gauge statistical significance, but it is the null hypothesis that is consistent with a well-specified 
distribution: an assumed model of independence is evaluated against the observed data. Put 
another way, when the p value is statistically significant (at .05) the model does not fit the data. 
Our model fit the data very well. Using a Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Test, our significance level, 
with 28 degrees of freedom, was .907.  
 
We were stubbornly uncompromising and conservative in conducting this study. All of the 
variables mentioned in this article were identified before we coded our first case. We also did not 
include in our model geographical variables which could be statistically powerful predictors (and 
which we coded from the outset). By adding the state where the opinion was issued the model 
could have leveraged that variable in states where the removal rate was especially high or low. In 
Louisiana, for example, (where all eight cases were removed,163) the model could have 
essentially encoded any case from Louisiana as a surefire removal, and there would be eight 
correct predictions in the model. To be sure, there is an argument for including geographic 
variables: there is a local legal culture in every state, and that culture might be a greater influence 
on case outcomes than variables that we include. Yet we thought it antithetical to our goal of 
creating a model that could be predictive of the future as well as the past, and creating a model 
that is generalizable rather than being localized to a particular region.  
 
Our final model did not include all of the consequential variables discussed in Part III.B.164 
We also considered adding an interaction variable for Republicans and eliteness of 
undergraduate education, for example, but this added complexity to the model without improving 
its predictions.165 
 
																																								 																				
162	In linear regression, summary measures of fit are functions of a residual defined as the difference between the 
observed and fitted value. In logistic regression there are several possible ways to measure the difference between 
the observed and fitted values.  
163 See Figure 3, supra. 
164 See generally HOSMER ET AL., supra, at 90 (“The rationale for minimizing the number of variables in the model 
is that the resultant model is more likely to be numerically stable, and is more easily adopted for use. The more 
variables included in a model, the greater the estimated standard errors become, and the more dependent the model 
becomes on the observed data.”) 
165	Adding an interaction variable for Republicans and eliteness of undergraduate education produced the following 
results.	
Figure	40.5	Logistic	Regression	of	Removal,		
Results	of	Alternative	Model	2	
LR	chi2(5)	=	26.36;	Prob	>	chi2	=	.000*** 
	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 P>|z|	
Female	 .722	 .385	 .060*	
Young	(≤55)	 .958	 .420	 .022**	
Tort	 .661	 .435	 .128	
Elite	LS	+	Democrat	 -	.436	 .163	 .007***	
Elite	UG	+	Republican	 -	.133	 .238	 .575	
_cons	 -.	415	 .553	 .453	
This model predicts the dataset with 64.3% accuracy, with true positive and true negative rates of 71% and 57%, 
respectively. 
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IV.  Conclusion 
 
Permitting or rejecting snap removal under the current statute requires judges to make a 
choice between a strong brand of textualism and a strong brand of purposivism. Both options are 
popular, but textualism is winning. We thus posed and answered the question: Who are these 
textualists? 
 
We analyzed data which showed that most of them were judges who were appointed by 
Republicans.166 The odds of removal by a Republican judge were 2.25 times the odds of removal 
by a Democratic judge. Further, when answering a pure legal question about the availability of a 
federal forum, Republican judges were especially sympathetic of defendants facing tort liability. 
Further still, the publication rates of both parties suggested deliberate efforts to spread each 
party’s competing ideology. 
 
But party was hardly a complete explanation. Indeed, judges appointed by Democrats 
allowed almost 40% of all snap removals.167 And Republicans were responsible for more than 
40% of all remands.168 Moreover, young judges of both parties were more inclined to remove 
than their senior colleagues. This finding aligned with other scholarship that has recognized the 
ascendance of a more constrained and technical understanding of the judicial process.169 Such is 
the consequence of the last three decades’ march toward a more formalist application of rules 
and statutes. 
 
We speculated that party may be a better predictor of case outcomes in the future. This is a 
likely consequence if a recent trend toward party polarization in removal rates continues. This 
trend was apparent in party removal rates in the past 5 years compared to the decade that 
preceded it. We also demonstrated that the judges appointed by each party’s presidents were 
more extreme (in both directions) than the appointments by their predecessors in those parties.  
 
																																								 																				
166 See Figure 8. 
167 Judges appointed by Democratic Presidents allowed 39 of the 102 snap removals.  
168 Judges appointed by Republican Presidents remanded 38 of the 91 remands. 
169 See Gluck & Posner, supra, 131 HARV. L. REV. at 1302-03. See generally Anton Metlitsky, The Roberts Court 
and the New Textualism, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 671, 688 (2016) (“[T]he Court's insistence on the modern textualist 
method in every case provides a clear signal to lower courts--and especially the intermediate federal appellate 
courts--that they, too, must follow the modern textualist approach to reading statutes, meaning that they must give 
effect to clear text unless they can plausibly justify labeling the text to be “ambiguous.” . . . [T]he courts of appeals 
are also likely to understand that open purposivism is verboten, which will likely mean fewer cases at the 
intermediate appellate level that depart from clear text in favor of statutory purpose.”); Krishnakumar, supra, 69 
DUKE L.J. at 1277 (challenging view that purposivism is dead, but also noting, “In the thirty-some years since the 
late Justice Scalia joined the U.S. Supreme Court and began waving the textualist flag, it has become in vogue to 
chronicle the Court's move toward a highly textualist approach to statutory interpretation. Scholars have, for 
example, noted a discernible decline in the rate at which the Court invokes legislative history, a marked increase in 
its use of dictionary definitions to interpret statutes, and a rise in its use of both linguistic and substantive canons of 
construction.”); Lawrence Baum & James J. Brudney, Two Roads Diverged: Statutory Interpretation by the Circuit 
Courts and Supreme Court in the Same Cases, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 840 (2019) (“The circuit courts' lower 
frequency of reliance on purpose (like their higher reliance on ordinary meaning and agency deference) may reflect 
attention to case-management priorities.”) 
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At the same time, however, we observed that party polarization was a product exclusively of 
the elites within each of the parties. Increasing eliteness levels in education were positively 
correlated with removals for Republicans and were negatively correlated for Democrats. But 
Republicans and Democrats who attended non-elite educational institutions had the same 
removal rates. Because party effects are a staple of empirical study, this finding about the 
intersection of party effects and education should force a reassessment of the role of political 
affiliation in judging. 
 
Women—especially Republicans—were more likely than men to reach textualist outcomes. 
Perhaps this finding was an anomaly of the relatively small sample size, but it registered as 
statistically significant and the inclusion of a gender variable improved the predictive capacity of 
all models we investigated. 
 
Our study included many other variables that bore no correlation with removal rates. Of 
course the lack of a finding is occasionally as telling and profound as the presence of 
significance. Variables that were statistically unimportant included race, the prospect of MDL 
consolidation, advanced age, advanced experience, senior status, and judicial experience on a 
state court. 
